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ABSTRACT: 
 
This thesis examines foreclosure sales of single-family homes in eight communities in the 
Boston Metro area and the price appreciation from purchase of a foreclosed property through to a 
subsequent fair market, arms-length sale. The post foreclosure sale price appreciation of the 
foreclosed properties is compared with price appreciation of fair market, arms length sales to 
discern the effects of a foreclosure on future price appreciation.  
 
RESULTS  
The magnitude of the price appreciation may be positively influenced, or in part, caused by 
investment to remediate defects in the property or to cure problems due to endemic 
disinvestment. On the other hand, it is quite probable there is a negative effect due to intractable 
problems and or stigma which cannot be cured with money or sweat equity; i.e. socio-economic 
factors such as changes in crime and poverty rates, macroeconomic conditions, floods or other 
natural mishaps. Price appreciation, as measured through actual repeat sales, from 8 cities in the 
Boston Metro area, indicate foreclosed properties appreciate more rapidly than normative, arm’s 
length transactions in those same markets. The results were unclear for sales pairs initiated in 
1991-1994, during a relatively flat market. However results are significant with sales pairs 
initiated in 1995-1997 and 1998-2000, during the real estate recovery and over various holding 
periods up to five years, using repeat sales data from 1987 through 2007. The Foreclosed Sale 
Pairs initiated from 1995-2000 dominated the Market Sale Pairs initiated during the same years 
over the two to five year holding periods. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Foreclosures are an integral, though dissonant, part of the mortgage industry. Foreclosure is the 
process by which a lender forces the sale of the property securing the mortgage. Everything from 
loan-to-value ratios to mortgage pricing to credit decisions are based on and priced off of 
historical loss severity and default rates and a borrower’s perceived propensity to default. In 
more concrete terms, everyone wants to avoid foreclosures, especially the lending institutions.  
 
1.A Historical Costs of Defaults 
 
Research into historical default rates and loss severity is fairly common as its utility to lending 
institutions is naturally quite high. Lenders use the information to set credit standards, lending 
policies and ultimately interest rates for differing loan products. Commercial loan defaults 
peaked for loans originated in 1986. This cohort defaulted at approximately 31%, the highest 
level recorded. Loss severity varies, but was estimated, on average, by Ciocetti at somewhere 
north of 40%.1 Hence the overall loss, on average to the lenders, was approximately, 12%. It is 
important to note not all defaults end in foreclosure. 
 
Single-family foreclosures peaked in the early 1990’s and are spiking once again. With a strong 
probability of severe loss severity it is obvious why the credit of the borrower, the equity 
position in the property and the value of the underlying property are so important (or should be, 
or should have been) to lenders. As we all know now, the advent of Collateralized Mortgage 
Backed Securities, removed the incentive to keenly qualify the borrower and property by 
allowing lenders to quickly package and sell the loans to third parties, thus relieving themselves 
of any future credit risk. Despite historical cyclicality in the single family real estate market, with 
its attendant waves of defaults and foreclosures, the great financial engineering machinations of 
Wall Street and beyond had devised a way to sidestep credit and property value issues by 
offloading the loans themselves, and by doing so the attendant risk, to willing third party 
investors hungry for “yield” in a post industrialized, deflationary, low yield world. As we know, 
and discuss later, the cycle did not disappear, there was no new paradigm and the moral hazard 
introduced by the clever financial engineering, while handsomely rewarding a few, only served 
to leverage the negative effects of the inevitable downward swing of the cycle. 
 
 
1.B The Borrower’s Put 
 
In theory there are two main motivating factors or precipitating causes for mortgage default. 
Lack of sufficient income to cover the payments and ancillary expenses is traditionally noted as 
the primary reason homeowners fall behind on payments and eventually end up in foreclosure. 
However there is another important, but perhaps less well understood, rationale for mortgage 
default. This second, subtler, effect can be termed the equity theory. More precisely I mean 
negative equity, as in the mortgage is worth more than the house. Research indicates as house 
loan-to-value ratios climb closer to 1, the risk of foreclosure climbs.  Furthermore as the value of 
                                                          
1
 Ciocetti, B.A., Loss Characteristics of Commercial Mortgage Foreclosure, Real Estate Finance, 1997, 14:1, 53-69. 
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the house falls below the value of the mortgage a negative equity situation develops. A small 
down payment can be wiped out by a decline in house prices, due to the resultant leverage. 
Harding, Miceli and Sirmans (2000) wrote on high LTV ratios. At LTV ratios near one, 
disinvestment in maintenance was common, with borrowers spending less than lower LTV 
borrowers, on average.2 The result of falling house prices can be a negative equity position for 
the borrower, and a real problem for the lender.3 If we assume that borrowers (people) are all 
rational economic actors (not likely) and the market price outlook is bleak the most financially 
advantageous option is to stop making payments, hand over the keys to the lender and walk away 
from the property. 
 
This second phenomena is what David Geltner at MIT has termed “the borrower’s put option”.4 
A put option, as in the stock market, gives the holder the right to sell a certain security at a 
certain price for a certain amount of time. As he notes “In the case of a non-recourse mortgage, 
the underlying asset is the collateral property, and the borrowers ability to default on the loan 
effectively gives him the ability to sell the property to the lender at a price equal to the 
outstanding loan balance. By defaulting on the loan, the borrower is said to “put” the property to 
the lender, thereby ridding himself of a liability equal, at least in book value, to the outstanding 
loan balance.”5 
 
It is quite likely that an interaction of both the income and equity theories is in play in many if 
not most foreclosures in the single family housing market. High initial loan-to-value ratios, 
combined with either rising interest rates and or falling house prices can set off a wave of 
foreclosures. Although it has been well chronicled it is worth mentioning that the most recent 
wave of foreclosures was either initiated or exacerbated by excess liquidity in the market, 
manifested through lax lending practices which resulted in large numbers of under-qualified 
borrowers borrowing too much money with or without onerous and largely opaque and complex 
terms. The result has been a massive wave of foreclosures the magnitude of which is still 
unknown. 
 
                                                          
2
 Harding, J., T. Miceli and C.F. Sirmans, Do Owners Take Better Care of their Housing than Renters, Real Estate 
Economics, 2000, 28:4, 663-81. 
3
 Negative equity is dealt with far differently in Asian countries. R.N.Lai, S.E. Ong and T.F. Sing 
explain in their 2006 paper “Values of Mortgages with Top-Up Payments” published in the 
International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance, Vol 9, #5. “Negative equity is a 
potential trigger of default by mortgagors, who may be financially better off by defaulting then 
continue servicing the mortgage. Mortgage documents in these Asian countries are commonly 
written with a provision to cushion the default risk by allowing the banks a wide leeway to 
request for a top-up when they are uncomfortable with the security margin in relation to the 
outstanding loan. Interestingly banks rarely take action when the value the value of the property 
falls below the mortgage outstanding as long as the mortgagor continues to service the loan. This 
suboptimal behavior is motivated by the fear that the bank’s action of demanding for the 
mortgage top-up may lead to the borrower’s default on the mortgage.” 
4
 Geltner, Miller, Clayton, Eicholtz, Commercial Real Estate Analysis and Investments pg. 400. 
5
 Ibid. 
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As we have seen the “subprime crisis” has sent tremors through the financial establishment in the 
U.S. as well as globally. Few are the Insurance Companies, Banks or Wall Street institutes 
(hedge funds, I-Banks, private equity) that have not felt the effects of the growing crisis. Due to 
my lack of ability to prognosticate accurately the future extent of the crisis I have decided to 
examine the closest analogue available: the previous housing slump and foreclosure spike of 
1990-1995 and the nascent recovery in the residential market through the year 2000. I will 
examine several different time periods and then consolidate all the data to summarize the 
findings. 
 
The reason for examining the previous cycle is to gain an understanding of the effects of 
foreclosure on underlying property values. More importantly I seek to measure the performance 
of those foreclosed properties subsequent to the foreclosure sale. My hypothesis is that single-
family properties sold through foreclosure should provide greater than average returns to buyers 
or investors. By this I mean that a foreclosed property will have a greater capital return, on a 
percentage basis, than a similar property purchased in an arm’s length transaction at fair market 
value. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2.A The State of The Nation and How Did We Get Here? 
 
Foreclosures have recently been garnering a large amount of attention in the public media. As the 
current real estate crisis unfolds everyone from neighborhood assistance groups to Congress, the 
White House and The Federal Reserve have been clamoring to either cure, deny or solve the 
problem, or some combination of all three. The Wall Street Journal predicted on June 24, 2008 
that US home prices would, on average, decline 25% from their peak in 2006.6 They noted a 
decline of that magnitude is on par with the Great Depression. It goes without saying that a 25% 
decline in a roughly $30TN asset class is a cataclysmic destruction of wealth, and in quite a short 
period of time. A $7.5TN loss in household wealth dwarfs the downturn of the precious cycle. 
The decline in the wealth effect, using the home as an ATM by financing out equity to then put 
back into the economy as consumption, is yet to be measured.  
 
Despite popular press fear mongering, or fire stoking, it must be remembered that a fair amount 
of the predicted decline is a retracement of recent gains. That may be cold comfort to those that 
purchased at the peak of the frenzy, yet it should lend some comfort to the rest of the country, 
and particularly to economists who fear another nasty bout of either disinflation or stagflation. 
Aggravating those fears of stagflation is a super commodity bull run. I intentionally decline to 
call it a bubble, as a bubble implies what Allen Greenspan famously termed “irrational 
exuberance” during the tech stock bubble. By irrational exuberance I believe Greenspan intended 
to elucidate the connection between earnings and price, ability to create free cash flow, or more 
generically some measure of intrinsic value. The current bull run in oil, gas, iron, and other 
metals and agricultural commodities is based in large part on the structural shift in the world 
economy, especially in India and China. As two billion people enter the world economy vast 
shifts in labor and resource usage patterns are emerging. Cheap labor drove factories overseas 
and artificially pushed down inflation rates for the developed world. At the same time 
consumption in developed countries poured massive amounts of dollars and euros to emerging 
producer nations, who then effectively recycled the money back into the hands of Western 
consumers through purchases of US Treasury bonds, hence pushing down yields on everything 
from the 10 year note to car loans, credit card rates, equity lines and of course home loans. 
 
Hence the changing forces of globalization have had a great impact on the US housing market. 
And now we are suffering through the secondary, knock-on effect of cheap offshore production, 
increased consumption and low rates. China and India have begun to accumulate wealth. With 
wealth comes consumption of oil, metals, concrete, cars and homes. The average US consumer 
uses approximately 50 barrels of oil a year. The average Chinese uses just 2 barrels. If the 
average Chinese move to consume one tenth what the average US citizen consumes the increase 
in yearly barrels used in China will be 3.9BN barrels a year. Whether one believes in Hubberts 
Peak7 or not it is hard to see how that increase can be accommodated, even in the intermediate 
                                                          
6
 Wall Street Journal, Print Edition, June 24, 2008. 
7
 Theory first espoused by King Hubbert in the late 1956 to accurately explain how and why US 
oil production would peak in the late 1960’s. Mark Williams wrote in February 2005 MIT 
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term, by planned or prospective oil exploration around the globe. Furthermore as wealth grows 
diets tend to shift from grains to meat. Meat is nothing more than a very inefficient grain 
conversion system. This is partially to blame for the huge run-up in grain prices. In concert with 
growing appetites for meat grain is also now being converted into fossil fuel substitutes, further 
pressuring agricultural commodities.  
 
Essentially our current real estate crisis and ensuing foreclosure epidemic has been in progress 
for years and was perhaps an inevitable result of long term population growth, successful efforts 
at globalization and the combination of global forces conspiring to provide cheap credit, easy 
credit terms unlocked by the moral hazard of the mortgage banking system (before the RMBS 
market shut down) and the unquenchable thirst for the American Dream, as realized by home 
ownership. (Even President George Bush aggressively pushed the “Ownership Society” in his 
first term. 
 
The discussion above is not meant to be an exhaustive dissection of the causative forces behind 
the current crisis. Even without the exogenous forces (nee, shocks perhaps) the relentlessly 
churning real estate cycle, as prescribed by economic laws of supply and demand and their 
elasticities (please talk to Dr. Bill Wheaton and MIT for clarification on this issue), would still 
have conspired to create another, at least, modest downturn. This point in macroeconomic history 
only laid the foundation for a far more severe oscillation in the normal cycle, adding enormous 
amounts of tinder, fuel and accelerants to an already very dry situation. Therefore the brief 
history is meant to give some appreciation for how we got where we are today. The more 
interesting (and difficult) question is where do we go from here. There is little doubt that 
foreclosures, already high by historic standards, will continue to rise for some time. It remains to 
be seen how much pain will be inflicted upon homeowners, lenders and the national economy 
during this downturn. In an election year (and beyond) there will certainly be government action, 
reaction, regulation, bailout or what-have-you. However, with what appears to be a structural 
shift in the world economy this real estate market, and real estate recession is now buffeted by 
many external factors not present in the early 1990’s.  
 
That being said the closest analogue to the foreclosure crisis circa 2008 is the previous real estate 
cycle, specifically the bust of the early 1990’s. Despite the enormity of the previous bust there 
has been little scholarly work undertaken on the subject of foreclosures and appreciation. There 
is a large body of work from popular magazines, newspapers and journals written during the 
downturn. In addition some efforts have been made to understand the causes and effects of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Technology Review(www.technologyreview.com), “In 1969 Hubbert predicted a graph of world 
oil production over time would look like a bell curve, with a peak around the year 2000.” This 
theory is extensively covered in Kenneth Deffeyes “Beyond Oil: The View from Hubberts 
Peak”. Williams further notes the announcement by Saudi Arabia in 2003 that it could not 
produce more oil in response to the Iraq war as an important turning point and acknowledgement 
that “there was no major underutilized source of oil left on the planet.” The theory was 
substantially confirmed in my interview with Roger Solly, hydro-geologist in exploration with 
Norwegian state oil company StatOil in May, 2008.) 
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1980’s upswing and subsequent bust. Furthermore research on historical remediation efforts has 
been undertaken. 
 
Nearly all the research on the previous cycle focused on the problem, how to solve the problem, 
how to help homeowners, how to save banks and the like. It was, as you may remember, 
politically and socially expedient to focus efforts on the cleanup. The stability of the greater 
economy was at stake, the banking system needed to be righted: hence the birth of Resolution 
Trust Corporation, basically a taxpayer financed bailout. In addition there were (and are) efforts 
to educate borrowers in hopes of averting another dislocating foreclosure wave. Whether or not it 
is possible to preclude such natural occurrences is another question beyond the scope of this 
report and best left to social scientists. Regardless, no research, to date, has focused on the 
subsequent effects of those foreclosures. More precisely no one has quantified the return to those 
intrepid purchasers of foreclosed properties. 
 
Perhaps it would have seemed uncouth at the time to be looking (lurking) for profits in the 
shadow of despair. More importantly it is impossible to measure appreciation without waiting for 
enough time to elapse for the foreclosed properties to sell again. Hence, I believe this is an 
opportune moment in history to calculate the returns to foreclosed homes and compare them with 
the returns to market transactions. In order to do this we can look at the existing foreclosure 
literature to gather a greater understanding of the process and its effects. 
 
 
I will not spend any space on the general foreclosure process as it is fairly well known. The 
process varies from state to state with every jurisdiction enacting its own time frames and legal 
frameworks. Suffice to say within 90 days, in most locales, a lender can forcibly evict an 
occupant and take title to the underlying property securing the mortgage. The mechanics matter 
little as the end result is the same. More interesting in light of this paper is how and why 
borrowers end up in the foreclosure process. Is it a long slow decline in the ability to pay or is 
there a trigger event? Are there more similarities or differences in foreclosure cases? 
 
2.B Negative Equity- “Necessary but Not Sufficient Condition” 
 
Two senior economists from the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Christopher L. Foote and 
Kristopher Gerardi, along with a research assistant Paul S. Willen (FGS) recently wrote an 
interesting paper examining foreclosures titled “Negative Equity and Foreclosure: Theory and 
Evidence”. They analyzed data from over 100,000 Massachusetts homeowners with negative 
equity in the early 1990’s. Less than 10% of those homeowners subsequently lost their homes. 
As they point out this is “completely consistent with economic theory, which predicts that from 
the borrowers perspective, negative equity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
foreclosure”.8 They insist that households need to experience negative equity and an external 
                                                          
8
 Foote, C.L., Gerardi, K., Willen, P.S., Negative Equity and Foreclosure: Theory and Evidence. Public Policy 
Discussion Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, June 5, 2008. 
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economic shock that severely decreases their ability to service the debt. “Cash-flow problems 
without widespread negative equity do not cause foreclosure waves.”9 
 
FGS use an econometric model to estimate between 6,500 and 7,600 of the 94,600 borrowers 
with negative equity in 2007:Q4 will suffer foreclosure. They further discuss loss mitigation 
programs and dismiss loan modification programs as presenting the same moral hazard as the 
original lending programs. Despite difficulties in identifying those who are at risk of foreclosure 
due to both negative equity and cash-flow problems FGS suggest some form of lender 
forbearance may be the most attractive and least costly avenue to helping avoid a foreclosure 
crisis. Where loan modification programs will help all borrowers, regardless of status “borrowers 
who do not need help are unlikely to find forbearance attractive, because this policy alters only 
the timing of repayment, not how much is owed.”10 
 
 
2.C Prior Research on Foreclosure Discounts 
 
2.C.1 Hedonic Methodology 
 
Much previous real estate appreciation research has used hedonic modeling. Hedonic methods 
depend on inputting all the relevant characteristics of a property, as hedonic modeling values real 
estate as the sum of its parts, assigning values to all characteristics that may influence value: i.e. 
number of bedrooms, bathrooms, presence of a deck, garage, age of house etc. All the 
components must be entered and scored and then a group of observations can be regressed to 
determine the value of each component and subsequently the value of any distinct piece of 
property by summing all the valuable components. Hence the price is a function of the 
components of the property and its location and, in this instance, whether or not it was a 
distressed sale. However, real estate is incredibly idiosyncratic and inefficient. Therein lies the 
problem with Hedonic modeling. How can one be sure he or she has captured all the relevant 
components of a property that add to its value? Only with an extremely large sample sizes can 
one be sure to exclude unwanted effects from missed variables. Nonetheless the hedonic method 
was the first method used to measure real estate appreciation with foreclosures. Hedonic 
methodology is still used in constructing indexes and to predict prices across markets. 
 
In 1990 Shilling, Benjamin and Sirmans (SBS) measured appreciation from a normal, market 
sale to a foreclosure sale using a Hedonic methodology. Their research, unfortunately, was 
limited to only, 62 observations, all condominium sales, in 1985, in a single complex in Baton 
Rouge, Louisiana. The study included condominiums sold in the open market and also units 
“liquidated” by a local lender. SBS estimated that properties that end up in foreclosure, sell, on 
average, for a 24% discount to market sales.11 The mean price per square foot of the distressed 
properties was $59.29 and the mean of the comparable properties was $66.28. They note “the 
                                                          
9
 Ibid, pg. 3. 
10
 Ibid., pg. 4. 
11
 J.D.Shilling, J.D.Benjamin and C.F. Sirmans, “Estimating Net Realizable Value for Distressed Real Estate”, 
Journal of Real Estate Research, 1990, Volume 5, Issue 1, pages 129-141. 
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regression analysis indicates that the discount on distressed real estate is roughly 24% of market 
value. The size of the discount is not surprising since the market value of these properties must 
be adjusted for the probability of receiving an offer to purchase during the expected marketing 
period as well as for the net carrying costs of the property.” They conclude there are two reasons 
market value overstates the net realizable value of a distressed sale. First, lenders either prefer, or 
need to sell in a compressed time frame, to remove the nonperforming loan and the property 
from their books. Second, SBS hypothesize that appraisers must take into account the cost of 
carrying the properties.  
 
In 1994 Forgey, Rutherford and Van Buskirk (FRV) used a hedonic method, which added zip 
code as one of the variables. They used a sample of 2,282 sales, of which 280 were foreclosure 
sales.  The data was from the Arlington, TX Multiple Listing Service from July 1991 to January 
1993. This time period corresponded to the national downturn and a deep economic slump for 
Texas. FRV found a 23% estimated discount to market sales, based on their sample of 2,282 
single-family sales.12 
 
Hardin and Wolverton (HW), in a 1996 study, used a hedonic methodology to once again 
measure the comparative discount between foreclosed property sales and fair market sales. Their 
method varied slightly with the inclusion of city dummy variables. Further, they examined 
income producing apartment prices. The study uses market rent as a variable to attempt to 
control for quality difference across the apartments in the sample. The data set comprised 90 
income producing apartment sales, 10% of which were foreclosure sales. The sales were all to 
non-institutional buyers. The apartment buildings were from 25-132 units. HW found a 22.1% 
discount for foreclosure sales relative to market sales. In their conclusion HW attempt to explain 
the reason for the significant discount effect. They note “Rationalizations found in the literature 
are that foreclosed property owners appear to be motivated by satisfaction of regulatory capital 
requirements, control over negative stock price effects, and protection of credit ratings. As a 
consequence, this class of property sellers does not fit the market value definition of a typically 
motivated seller, and they have a rationale for accepting reduced market prices in exchange for a 
quick sale.”13 
 
2.C.2 Rebuttal of Hedonic Model Price Discount Results 
  
 
A 1997 comment paper, written by Carroll, Clauretie and Neill (CCN) questioned the results 
obtained above and extended the work of FRV, using a sample of 2,000 sales from Las Vegas, 
Nevada from 1990-1993.  In the introduction they posit, “There is no reason to suspect, a priori, 
that the selling price of a property will be affected by who the seller may be. A 23% discount 
should afford ample opportunities to make excess profits, even after transaction costs, by trading 
in such properties. In the extreme, imagine buying a property at a 23% discount because it is 
                                                          
12
 F.A. Forgey, R.C. Rutherford, M.L. Van Buskirk. “Effect of Foreclosure Status on Residential Selling Price” 
Journal of Real Estate Research, 1994, Volume 9, Issue 3, pages 313-319. 
13
 W.G. Hardin III, M.L. Wolverton, “The Relationship between Foreclosure Status and Price”, The Journal of Real 
Estate Research, 1996, Volume 12, Issue 1, pages 101-120. 
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foreclosed and then selling it without any repairs whatsoever the next day under non-foreclosed 
status. Are we to believe there will be a 23% appreciation in this short period?”14 
 
CCN disavow the results of the previous research mainly on the basis of illogical or missing 
controls. The conclusion they reach is that foreclosed properties do not truly sell at a discount to 
the prevailing market sale price. They instead theorize, “that foreclosed properties sell at a 
discount because of the condition of the property itself, the condition of the neighborhood within 
which the property lies, or both.”15 Previous results, including those of FVR, would appear to be 
abrogated by CCN’s assertions. The core disagreement is over how to control for neighborhood 
quality and to some degree property quality. When using a similar methodology to FVR CCN 
obtained similar results. However CCN extended the work of FVR by controlling for location 
and obtained far different results. 
 
FVR controlled for location with zip codes. However they were entered as cardinal variables 
instead of nominal variables. CCN’s results indicate that correctly controlling for zip codes as 
nominal variables significantly contributes to the “Foreclosure Effect”. For their research CCN 
chose non-foreclosed properties within one block of the foreclosed properties. Modern cities can 
be very finely grained with large changes in neighborhoods from block to block. Depressed 
neighborhoods seem to create a critical mass of disinvestment and foreclosures, a vicious cycle 
with a built in feedback loop that creates more and more foreclosures. As such, tightly 
controlling for location (proximity to foreclosures) is the only way to accurately reflect the 
impact of the immediate neighborhood condition on pricing. 
 
CCN’s data consisted of 1,974 sales in Las Vegas, 385 of which were foreclosed properties sold 
by HUD and 19 by other lenders. They included 969 properties within one block of the HUD or 
lender owned properties. Another 602 properties not within a block of the foreclosed properties 
were analyzed. The results are stunning. “In the log-linear model without zip code dummies, 
houses in HUD neighborhoods sell for 11.58% less than houses with the same characteristics, 
while HUD foreclosures sell for an additional 8.38% discount. Introducing zip code dummies 
reduces the discount on properties in HUD neighborhoods to 8.31%, with HUD foreclosures 
selling for a mere .17% less than other neighborhood properties.”16 
 
2.D “Foreclosure Effect Versus “Location Effect” 
 
The ultimate conclusion of the comment paper, “We must conclude that foreclosed properties 
sell for lower prices because of hidden defects (leading to negative equity when discovered) or 
due to neighborhood characteristics. Arbitrage possibilities appear to be unattainable in the 
efficient market sense”17 leaves numerous questions of causality open. If the discount is truly a 
neighborhood discount what happens after the foreclosure sales? If there is excess appreciation 
                                                          
14
 T.M. Carroll, T.M. Clauretie, H.R. Neill, “Effect of Foreclosure Status on Residential Selling Price: Comment” 
Journal of Real Estate Research, 1997, Volume 13, Issue 1, pages 95-102. 
15
 Ibid, page 95. 
16
 Ibid, page 100. 
17
 Ibid, page 102. 
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in the foreclosure sales is this appreciation based on neighborhood appreciation or some other 
aspect of the foreclosure wave?  
 
Perhaps the severe disinvestment wrought by a foreclosure wave creates an inflection point in the 
neighborhood. Only when the neighborhood has severely declined do investors sense it is the 
time to buy and renovate and hence the neighborhood, and the foreclosed properties, profit from 
new investment, low starting point and a structural shift in the neighborhood. Or perhaps 
foreclosure appreciation rates are truly neighborhood rates cloaked by the presence of a 
foreclosure incident. 
 
There is research on differential historical appreciation rates in depressed versus affluent towns 
that sheds some light on the conundrum. Research by Karl Case and Maryna Marychenko (CM) 
in 2001 looked at appreciation rates in 235 zip codes in the Boston metro area. They found 
“prices turned around early in 1992 and rose steadily through the end of the observation period in 
1998. During this period, the high end of the market substantially outperformed the low end. 
Nominal price increases in the highest income group of ZIP codes were three times greater than 
the price increases in the lowest income group of ZIP codes.”18 Annualized increases in value, 
from 1983 to 1998 were broken down by zip code into quintiles and also the top and bottom 10% 
of zip codes, as defined by median income. From 1983 to 1998 the top 10% of zip codes 
appreciated at an average of 7.9% annually while the bottom 10% appreciated 6.4% annually. 
From Q2 1992 to Q2 1998 the top 10% again outperformed the bottom 10% with an annualized 
gain of 5.9% versus 2.0%.19 This time period corresponds with the time frame analyzed in this 
study. Furthermore the cities in this study are all included in the 235 zip codes of the CM study. 
It would appear that location, location, location is more than quaint advice parents and brokers 
impart to would-be first time buyers. Perhaps it could be rephrased as the rich get richer and the 
poor get poorer. 
Research by William Wheaton and Denise DiPasquale support CM’s findings. They theorize that 
everyone maximizes their happiness and effectively everyone achieves, in a rational world, 
optimal, equal happiness. In financial terms this means one pays more to live at the city center, to 
be close to employment and amenities. This premium, in theory, offsets neatly the cost to 
commute to and from the employment center. Hence the lower cost of housing in far-flung 
suburbs and exurbs is just compensation for commuting expenses, be they real dollar expenses or 
the cost of lost time and opportunity.20 In time of job loss or transportation cost increases, we 
would expect a return to the city core and to the more affluent inner suburbs, a reverse migration 
and growth in the housing price differential between the city and the outer suburbs. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests such a shift is now taking place due to the rapid increase in the cost of 
petroleum distillates. Public transportation is also seeing increased ridership in Boston and other 
cities. So-called “Smart Growth” residential projects located at or near public transportation tend 
to outperform, in terms of rent and sales velocity, less convenient locations. 
                                                          
18
 Kase, C., Marychenko, M., “Home Price Appreciation in Low- and Moderate- Income Markets”, Low-Income 
Homeownership Working Paper Series, Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, August, 2001.  
19
 Ibid, page 8. 
20
 Wheaton, W. C., DiPasquale, D. Real Estate Economics, 1996. 
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Hence, during downturns in the economy the poorer, outer suburbs decrease in price more than 
the inner suburbs or city itself. Furthermore they are later to rise during the next cyclical upturn. 
It is no surprise that long depressed cities located 20 miles or more outside Boston produce a 
disproportionate number of foreclosures. Job losses have been steep during previous declines. As 
workers lose their jobs in the outer suburbs they necessarily search for work in the closest 
employment center available, typically the center city, in this case Boston. Hence their 
transportation costs surge and they, on average, seek homes and apartments closer to Boston, or 
have less to spend on housing in their chosen suburb. This price differential, based primarily on 
employment availability and proximity, to a certain degree drives the cycle and induces the 
strong swings in rents and prices seen in the outer suburbs. As workers commute further or move 
elsewhere prices (and sometimes rents) fall and create negative equity, negative cash flow and 
ultimately waves of foreclosures. 
 
2.E Repeat Sales Methodology 
 
To overcome the limitations of hedonic modeling Anthony Pennington-Cross (PC) used repeat 
sales in a 2006 paper to estimate the price discount of foreclosed sales. PC sought to understand 
whether repeat sales pairs consisting of a market sale and ending with a foreclosure sale 
appreciate in a systematically different manner than market to market repeat sales pairs. He finds 
that “the results indicate that the expected appreciation rates for foreclosed property…are lower 
than area appreciation rates.”21 He further speculates “the cause of this heterogeneity of 
appreciation rates may be due to changes in the neighborhood characteristics or changes in the 
characteristics of the property. For example, the neighborhood could suffer from increased crime 
or a reduction in school quality or the property could be flooded and not be fully repaired.”22 
 
 It is evident that there are a myriad of factors, which influence specific property values. To 
enumerate and measure them all, as in an exploded regression analysis, is nearly impossible. 
Nonetheless it is possible to regress what we surmise are the major contributing factors to price 
appreciation to gain an understanding of the causative forces behind the results. 
 
PC specified three regression series to test variables he thought contributed to the cumulative 
appreciation discount he found; 22%. He notes the discount is not just bunched at the time of 
foreclosure sale but is cumulative over the life of the loan or ownership period. PC compares 
2,280 observations against the OFHEO metropolitan area house price levels to ascertain the 
discount. Next he looked at the time a property was owned by a lender, the time in pre-
foreclosure or pre-reo, different legal statutes concerning foreclosure in the areas of the 
observations (whether judicial foreclosure process, statutory right of redemption or a state where 
the lender cannot declare a deficiency judgment), initial loan-to-value ratio, spread of the 
contract loan rate at origination over the market interest rate and the loan amount.  
 
                                                          
21
 Pennington-Cross, A. “The Value of Foreclosed Property”, The Journal of Real Estate Research,2006, Volume 28, 
Issue 2, pages 193-214. 
22
 Ibid, page 194. 
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While the overall discount, as mentioned, was significant at 22%, the coefficients of the 
variables have far more explanatory power. The adjusted R2 of the first specification, which only 
considers time as reo or pre-reo is .587. Hence the first regression accounts for 59% of the 
foreclosure discount. More time spent as property owned by the lender means an increased 
discount. PC speculates that as property is held losses are increasing, bargaining power is 
decreasing and pressure to sell is mounting.23 In addition loans, which get into trouble earlier 
have increased discounts. 
 
Specification II includes legal and housing market conditions and produces an adjusted R2 of 
.603. Specification III includes “other mortgage related factors” and produces and adjusted R2 of 
.64.  Interestingly PC found where metropolitan prices have declined the discount is larger. The 
loan information yields some interesting results. Higher loan-to-value ratios are linked to lower 
discounts. This, at first, appears counter intuitive as higher LTV’s are positively linked to greater 
incidence of foreclosure. However PC theorizes that higher LTV ratios fall into foreclosure more 
quickly and hence suffer lower discounts than lower LTV ratio loans that default later in their 
life.  
 
PC concludes “While the results do not indicate that the foreclosure itself causes the price 
appreciation deviation, they are consistent with the notion that foreclosure proxies for other 
neighborhood- or property-specific characteristics, such as a neighborhood in decline.”24 While 
there is some understanding of what causes the discount, there is still a fair amount of variability 
left unexplained. Nonetheless the repeat sales methodology produced similar results to the 
hedonic models discussed above. In addition an attempt was made to quantify the effects of 
several different variables and their component contribution to the cumulative discount found in 
the repeat sales model. 
 
In the next section I explain the data and methodology of my repeat sales analysis. This analysis, 
instead of looking at the cumulative discount of a sale pair that ends in a foreclosure, wipes the 
slate clean and starts with a foreclosure as the first of two sales in the pair. This method, while 
similar, seeks to answer a different question. Although the “Foreclosure Discount Effect” and 
subsequent appreciation are really two sides of the same coin I believe I can be cavalier in this 
study and ignore the previously answered question. I will ignore the discount and look at the 
subsequent behavior. Although the discount will not factor into my study the reason behind it 
will be addressed. Whether either or both effects are based on “Location Effect” or “Foreclosure 
Effect” is an interesting question. However, in the end, to an investor, particularly to a contrarian 
minded, value based, arbitrage-seeking investor, the reasons should not matter as long as they 
have the confidence they will make money. It is another question entirely whether one can profit 
without understanding the underlying mechanics of the market in which they choose to invest!  
  
                                                          
23
 Ibid., page 210. 
24
 Ibid., page 211. 
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Chapter 3: Data and Methodology 
 
3.A Data Source and City Choice 
 
The sole source of data for this study is single family home repeat sales data from The Warren 
Group, in Boston, MA. The Warren Group has collected and published real estate related news 
and transaction data since its founding in 1872. The Warren Group collects data from every deed 
and mortgage recorded in Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode Island.25 The database includes 
roughly 65 variables on every property record. These variables include street address, latitude 
and longitude, square footage, bedroom count, date of last sale, sale price, deedtype and saletype. 
A complete list of the variables can be found in the appendix. The repeat sale data set has been 
tracked for decades but became far more complete in 1987. Nearly all of Massachusetts, with the 
exception of a few towns with incomplete data, are covered.  
 
Initially I looked to use data from a few locales in the Boston Metro area. However, it readily 
became apparent that a larger sample size was needed. As such 8 local cities (Brockton, Chelsea, 
Everett, Lowell, Lynn, Revere, Somerville, Taunton) were chosen for their relatively depressed 
economies and large number of foreclosures during the preceding real estate cycle. Summary 
data from the 1990 and 2000 Census is located in the appendix to familiarize readers with the 
cities in this study. As noted in the literature review foreclosures tend to be concentrated in 
poorer neighborhoods and towns. All of the cities are considered part of the greater Boston 
Metro area.  
 
During the real estate boom of the 1980’s these cities were generally the last places to participate 
in the boom. Even so, there was little new construction in many of the cities.  As the tide turned 
and the market crashed they were particularly hard hit by falling home prices and a 
disproportionate number of foreclosures. Hence these cities were a natural choice to measure the 
effect of foreclosures. 
 
For contrast I examined several affluent communities in the Boston area. As one might suspect, 
there are few foreclosures in the more affluent communities. Examining a number of Boston’s 
affluent suburban communities including Weston, Wellesley, Dover, Lexington and Andover 
yielded few foreclosures. Hence my ability to measure appreciation subsequent to foreclosures in 
affluent towns, and by extension, in more expensive properties, was thwarted. Previous research, 
as well as anecdotal evidence, suggests foreclosed homes in desirable communities sell at a 
smaller discount than those in less desirable communities. 
 
Due to lack of significant data in the affluent communities I have focused on economically 
depressed cities. Where foreclosures are generally clustered most densely in depressed cities and 
towns I believe I will capture most of the effect of foreclosures on subsequent pricing. Depressed 
cities and towns produce a disproportionate number of foreclosures. The affluent towns 
mentioned above can be thought of as a distinct product, nearly a different market. Whereas 
buyers and borrowers in depressed cities are very sensitive to interest rate moves or other 
                                                          
25
 www.TheWarrenGroup.com 
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external shocks buyers in towns like Wellesley and Lexington are generally more educated, 
professionally employed and on the whole far more insulated from the vagaries of exogenous 
shocks in the economy or the housing market. As noted in the literature review LTV’s closer to 
one are positively linked with increased incidents of foreclosure. Affluent buyers putting down 
20, 30 or 50% down payments are far less likely to default and in turn do not produce foreclosure 
evidence for us to study! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Map of Metro Boston with Cities Highlighted 
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As noted all of the cities in this study are located in the Greater Boston area. Manufacturing 
flourished in New England during the 19th Century. Most of the large mills in the region were 
hydro-powered. As power generation became more widespread manufacturing started to move 
first to the Southeastern US and ultimately overseas to low cost labor providers in Mexico and 
Southeast Asia. Many of the large manufacturing cities in New England experienced precipitous 
declines in their fortunes. Job losses led to population declines and to overall declines in the 
cities. Disinvestment in commercial and residential property became the norm and over time the 
fabric of the neighborhoods disintegrated. Entire cities dissipated and slowly morphed into 
blighted relics, littered with enormous, functionally obsolete and abandoned mill buildings. In 
many ways the cities are still trying to regain their previous standing.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Map of Greater Boston with All 8 Cities Highlighted 
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3.B Methodology 
 
To ascertain Foreclosure sale (and market sale) appreciation I used a repeat sales procedure. The 
hedonic model certainly has some predictive and explanatory power however it is too 
cumbersome and inaccurate for my purposes. Instead of searching in the dark trying to predict 
price appreciation from a model I have chosen to use historical data to arrive at actual, ex-post, 
returns in the real world. 
 
Data sorting and manipulation was performed in Stata version 10. Data subsets were then output 
into Excel spreadsheets. Annual appreciation rates and other counts were performed in Microsoft 
Excel. In Stata I took a number of steps to limit the sample size and clean the data for analysis. In 
the SALETYPE category all non-arms length sales were dropped. Similarly all Nominal Sales 
(sales with recorded prices of $100 or less) were dropped. In addition all “Intra-Corporate” and 
“Intra-Family” and “LowPrice/HighYield” sales were dropped as the recorded sale prices may 
reflect non-market considerations, which may influence the sale price in unpredictable manners. 
Furthermore, for any duplicate entries the second observation in the pair of duplicate sales, as 
evidenced by identical PROPID and identical SALEPRICE was dropped. All sales prior to 1990 
were dropped from the data set. In addition all sales after 2005 were dropped from the data set. 
 
3.C Time Series 
 
There was a spike in foreclosures in the Boston Metro area in the early 1990’s. I initially sought 
to examine this period and limited the initial foreclosure sales time frame to the years 1990-1994. 
Hence all data before 1990 was dropped. The other reason for this decision was to limit the effect 
of the previous cycle on the data. More importantly the Warren Group data is only complete 
from 1987 forward, so properties with recent foreclosures or other non-arms length sales cannot 
be identified. 
 
However, the residential real estate market was rather flat after the early 1990’s downturn. Hence 
I thought it would be instructive to also analyze sales pairs initiated in 1995-2000 and their 
subsequent sales from 1996 through 2005. This later timeframe was a much more vibrant and 
volatile period in residential real estate sales and I suspected would yield interesting results.  
 
One of the greatest challenges in undertaking repeat sales investigations is to control for the 
holding period. The holding period may be the greatest contributor to performance (see 
discussion later). However even with data from 8 cities there were still not enough foreclosure 
sales pairs to do a year-by-year analysis. Therefore I grouped data into year brackets. I broke the 
data into four subsets: sales pairs initiated (first sale) in 1990-1991, sales pairs initiated in 1992-
1994, sales pairs initiated in 1995-1997 and sales pairs initiated in 1998-2000. The subsequent 
sales in the pairs occurred from one to five years after the initial sales. Table 1 below displays 
the breakdown in data into four subsets. 
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Table 1 
Time Series Data    
    
Sales Pairs Examined    
   
 
Initial Sale Years Subsequent or Closing Sale Years 
   
 
1990-1991 1992-1996   
1992-1994 1995-1999   
   
 
1995-1997 1996-2002   
1998-2000 1999-2005   
 
 
3.D Foreclosure Data Set 
 
From this expurgated data set two subsets of data were culled. The first subset was all properties 
with a foreclosure. All property ID’s (PROPID) with “Foreclosure” in the DEEDTYPE category 
were grouped into a temporary file. The full data set was then polled, or compared against the 
temporary foreclosure file. This action then restored all matching PROPID’s from the full data 
set into a new file and grouped all the sales by PROPID. Hence the new file contained all 
PROPID’s with DEEDTYPE “Foreclosure” and all their precedent and subsequent sales. The 
variable “sale_year” was then converted into new variables, one of which was “Y” for 
year(actual year of sale). Another new variable was calculated as “Years Elapsed”. “Years 
Elapsed” measures the years between a pair of sales. Unfortunately many of the actual dates 
(with month and day) were missing and any incremental accuracy from their use was lost. One 
more variable was created in Stata, “Price Difference”. This variable subtracted the previous sale 
price from the most recent sale price and output the difference.  
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Table 2 
Time Series Data    
    
Foreclosure Sales Pairs Examined   
   
 
Initial Sale Years Subsequent or Closing Sale Years 
   
 
1990-1991 1992-1996   
1992-1994 1995-1999   
   
 
1995-1997 1996-2005   
1998-2000 1999-2005   
 
 
3.E Market Sale Data Set 
 
The second subset comprised all sales without “Foreclosure” in the DEEDTYPE category. The 
methodology was similar to that used for the Foreclosure data, however any PROPID with 
“Foreclosure” in the DEEDTYPE category was dropped altogether. This did eliminate some 
market price repeat sales pairs. However this step was taken to ensure any persistency of effects 
from foreclosures was not present. For instance, if there were a foreclosure sale in 1991 and then 
a pair of market sale in 1992 and 1993 the entire grouping of three sales was dropped. An 
extension of this research would be to measure the persistency of foreclosure appreciation rates 
by analyzing the second and third market sales subsequent to the initial foreclosure sales. 
Furthermore one could analyze market sales before and after a foreclosure. Although surely 
instructive these exercises were beyond the scope of this report. 
 
When output to Excel the market repeat sales pairs far outnumbered the foreclosure sales pairs. 
This result is partly a product of the time period and locations (Cities) studied. In more affluent 
cities and towns there were far fewer foreclosures and much higher ratios of market sales to 
foreclosure sales. It has oft been argued that foreclosures beget more foreclosures as vacant, 
abandoned buildings suffer disinvestment and vandalism, creating a neighborhood wide decline. 
This likely contributes to the sub-par appreciation rates discussed in the literature review. This 
sub-par performance may well sow the seeds of greater appreciation subsequent to the 
foreclosure wave. 
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Table 3 
Time Series Data    
    
Market Sales Pairs Examined   
   
 
Initial Sale Years Subsequent or Closing Sale Years 
   
 
1990-1991 1992-1996   
1992-1994 1995-1999   
   
 
1995-1997 1996-2005   
1998-2000 1999-2005   
 
 
 
3.F. Final Calculations 
 
The subset data is used to measure foreclosure sale pair appreciation in Excel by sorting 
foreclosure sales by year of initial sale. Next the price difference (gain or loss) was divided by 
the initial sale price to compute an absolute return. The absolute return is divided by the years 
elapsed to compute the annual appreciation of the sale pair. All observations reporting over 
100% annualized returns are dropped from the reported results as they likely represent either 
large-scale renovations, significant additions or assessor or registry level data errors. All of the 
dropped observations are listed in the Appendix.  
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Chapter 4: Results 
 
4.A Caveats 
 
The data subsets described above were all treated similarly. Price appreciation is calculated by 
dividing the “Price Difference” by the first of the paired sales. This is then divided by the years 
elapsed to arrive at an annual appreciation rate. Keep in mind these are unlevered appreciation 
rates. Most buyers, especially buyers of foreclosed properties will have taken mortgages of at 
least 80% loan-to-value. On many of the more recent transactions LTV’s are 90% and above. In 
the early 1990’s LTV’s were typically between 80-90%. Levered returns, where positive, are 
obviously far higher than the unlevered returns reported in this study. However it must also be 
noted that I have not taken into account transaction costs, which can range from 4-6% of 
purchase price. These returns also do not account for either income tax shields from mortgage 
debt nor the value of occupying the house through some imputed rent calculation. 
 
Instead of applying assumed frictional costs and adding back average imputed rents gleaned 
from regional indices I left the performance numbers raw, as they are. One can assume and apply 
factors customary and appropriate to their economic condition and region of the country. In the 
same manner, if examining a prospective investment one can lever these returns, in a 
hypothetical sense, with current LTV ratios and interest rates. 
 
The average annual appreciation numbers are all reported as percentile returns. It would be just 
as simple to report absolute dollar returns, however I believe the information would be far less 
instructive and not applicable in a wider sense to a diversity of regions with widely varying 
median single family home prices. 
 
 
4.B Foreclosure and Market Sales Pairs Initiated in 1990-1991 
 
The first subset examined is comprised of sales pairs initiated in 1990 and 1991. The initial 
impetus behind this research was to examine the foreclosure wave during the early 1990’s, which 
may prove useful during the current crisis. Previous research indicated a “Foreclosure Effect”, 
which, as discussed may really just be “Location Effect”. Hence I thought it would be interesting 
to examine what happens after the foreclosure sale. By looking at the next fair market sale and 
comparing the pair to a pair of fair market sales we would answer two questions. First it would 
either confirm or deny the presence of a “Foreclosure” or “Location Effect” and support (or not) 
whether the single-family home market is an efficient market. Second, the results would yield 
valuable information as to the returns available to investors (homeowners, lenders etc) in 
foreclosed properties. 
 
My initial hypothesis was that the single-family market was not efficient. Just go house hunting 
for a few months and you quickly get the sense (anecdotal of course) that there are so many 
variations in the physical product and so many motivations of the individual participants that the 
market can hardly function efficiently in an economic theory sense. However as the tabular 
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results below indicate there was no clear out-performance by the foreclosed sales pairs. Neither 
group dominated over the full time periods tested. 
 
 
Table 4 
 
 
 
The sample sizes for the foreclosure pairs declines with time, hence the combined holding period 
for years 4 & 5. Interestingly the market pair sample size increases as time goes by, indicating 
that either foreclosure buyers are buying and flipping the houses, or during this time period, 
when the market was still in decline, perhaps they needed to sell again to escape the burden of 
the carrying costs. I suspect fair market buyers may have been more stable and looking for a 
place to stay, hence the increased tenure. 
 
 
Table 5 
Foreclosure Sales Pairs Initiated in 1990-1991
Holding Period (Years) 1 2 3 4 & 5
Average Annual Appreciation -10% -8% -3% -5%
Net Number of Observations 74 18 11 8
Observations Dropped 9 3 0 0
Initial Purchase in Years 1990-1991
Corresponding Sales in Years 1992-1997
Market Sales Pairs Initiated in 1990-1991
Holding Period (Years) 1 2 3 4 & 5
Average Annual Appreciation 9% -4% -5% -4%
Net Number of Observations 34 64 105 289
Observations Dropped 5 0 0 0
Initial Purchase in Years 1990-1991
Corresponding Sales in Years 1991-1996
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The lack of significant out-performance may be due to any number of factors. It may be that a 
number of the buyers were speculative investors, drawn by low prices and the opportunity of a 
quick profit. Further there is no way to know how much buyers spent to rehabilitate either the 
foreclosed properties or the market sales. It seems reasonable to assume the foreclosed properties 
suffered greater disinvestment and needed more work. Then again, the buyers may have been 
less financially capable of performing needed renovations. Hence, throughout this study the 
question will remain as to the level of contribution to the performance of rehabilitation or more 
simply- “How much did they put into it?” Therefore, although the performance numbers tell the 
story, they must also be looked at critically, as I believe the issue of post purchase investment is 
not insignificant in the context of foreclosed properties sold quickly for a profit. One last note, 
profit-seeking investors do well to invest as little as possible (as little as necessary) post sale to 
achieve a quick profit. This makes estimating post sale investment even trickier.  
 
A graph of the returns is provided on the next page. 
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Figure 3 Foreclosure & Market Sales Pairs 1990-1991 
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4.C Foreclosure and Market Sales Pairs Initiated in 1992-1994 
As noted previously there were not enough foreclosure pairs to examine sales year by year, 
hence the four groupings of initial sale years. This second group is comprised of sale pairs 
initiated in the years 1992-1994. The residential market was still in decline during these years, 
which colored the results of the earlier grouping. The second grouping, I believed, would pick up 
on the nascent recovery in the residential market underway in the mid 1990’s. Once again my 
hypothesis was that the Foreclosed Sale Pairs would outperform the market sale pairs over all 
holding periods. The performance difference could be due to low purchase price, excess 
volatility in riskier neighborhoods or a number of other factors. 
 
As evidenced by the tables below the hypothesis did not hold true. There was not a significant 
performance advantage to the foreclosure sale pairs. In fact the Market Sale Pairs posted higher 
average returns over all four holding periods  
Table 6 
 
 
Table 7 
Cleaned Foreclosure Sales Pairs Initiated in 1992-1994
Holding Period (Years) 1 2 3 4 & 5
Average Annual Appreciation -8% -6% -1% 5%
Number of Observations 527 77 33 45
Observations Dropped 23 2 1 0
Initial Purchase in Years 1992-1994
Corresponding Sales in Years 1993-1999
Cleaned Market Sales Pairs Initiated in 1992-1994
Holding Period (Years) 1 2 3 4 & 5
Average Annual Appreciation 11% 4% 4% 6%
Net Number of Observations 122 183 247 687
Observations Dropped 14 3 1 2
Initial Purchase in Years 1992-1994
Corresponding Sales in Years 1993-1999
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There are several possible explanations for the lack of differential returns. The market, although 
recovering, was still rather flat. Evidence suggests better neighborhoods recover more quickly. If 
the bulk of the foreclosures were in more depressed neighborhoods within their respective cities 
sales in those cities would likely underperform, relative to the city average in the beginning of a 
recovery. Similarly, the market sales may also have represented good values in somewhat better 
neighborhoods and would then, perhaps, have recovered more quickly. Indeed market buyers 
may have been more financially capable of maintaining and rehabilitating their properties, 
resulting in higher repeat sales prices. 
 
The only way to truly tease out the location effect is to map the sales and control for 
neighborhood variations. This would separate “Location Effect” from “Foreclosure Effect”. 
Unfortunately that control is beyond the scope of this report. It may not matter to an investor as 
the return is the return. To take a more sophisticated approach, one which a typical homebuyer 
would not likely apply, investors would want to understand the location versus foreclosure return 
dynamics. 
 
The results are reproduced in graphical format on the next page.
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Figure 4 Foreclosure & Market Sales 1992-1994 
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It is worth discussing the returns in terms of relative risk. If depressed neighborhoods are truly 
more volatile (they appear to be so) and by extension a riskier investment, then an investor 
should be compensated for accepting increased risk. The data from 1992-1994 do not indicate 
any excess compensation for purchasing foreclosed properties. It may be that entire cities are 
considered equally risky and that no risk premium to foreclosed properties was warranted at the 
time.  
 
This idea intrigued me and led me to look at the next time frames available, bringing repeat sales 
up into the middle of our most recent boom. Investors did not receive excess compensation for 
purchasing foreclosed properties in severely depressed cities during a relatively flat to slightly 
upward trending residential market (1990-1994). Would investors making the same bet, buying 
foreclosed properties in depressed cities only now during a strong upward surge in the residential 
market (1995-2000) be compensated or realize a risk premium upon subsequent repeat sale? 
 
4.D Foreclosure and Market Sales Pairs Initiated in 1995-1997 
 
Once again the data was split into two subsets. The first subset is comprised of initial sales from 
1995-1997. The only challenge in examining this later time frame is the number of foreclosures 
was in decline. Therefore the sample sizes are somewhat smaller than I would like. Nonetheless 
the Foreclosure Sale Pairs dominated the Market Sale Pairs over all holding periods except Year 
1. As you can see in the tables below the results were dramatic.  
 
The hypothesis that Foreclosed Sales Pairs return more than Market Sales Pairs is strongly 
supported by the 1995-1997 data. Causation remains unclear. Without controlling location down 
to a neighborhood or even micro-neighborhood level we cannot be sure that the “Foreclosure 
Effect” is not in reality “Location Effect”. That being said, as a first hand witness to the previous 
real estate cycle and a lifelong resident of the Boston Metro area it is clear that the depressed 
cities chosen for this study were (and in some cases still are) significantly stigmatized. I do not 
dispute neighborhood differences vis-à-vis disinvestment and lack of maintenance. However to 
either an outside observer, or even a potential investor, all the neighborhoods had similar 
problems and deterioration. A buyer has access to the same schools, same infrastructure, same 
crime problems and same city government regardless of neighborhood. Whether investors 
explicitly demand a risk premium for investing in these cities I cannot answer definitively. It 
seems reasonable to expect either an explicit or implicit risk premium demanded through a 
discounted purchase price. 
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Table 8 
 
 
 
 
Table 9 
 
Once again a graph of the 1995-1997 sales pairs is reproduced below. 
Cleaned Foreclosure Results for Sales Pairs Initiated in 1995-1997
Holding Period (Years) 1 2 3 4 & 5
Average Annual Appreciation 11% 23% 19% 31%
Net Number of Observations 256 28 4 21
Observations Dropped 36 4 1 3
Initial Purchase in Years 1995-1997
Corresponding Sales in Years 1996-2002
Cleaned Market Results for Sales Pairs Initiated in 1995-1997
Holding Period (Years) 1 2 3 4 & 5
Average Annual Appreciation 23% 15% 16% 18%
Net Number of Observations 190 330 500 852
Observations Dropped 39 0 2 4
Initial Purchase in Years 1995-1997
Corresponding Sales in Years 1996-2002
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Figure 5 Foreclosure & Market Sales 1995-1997 
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4.E Foreclosure and Market Sales Pairs Initiated in 1998-2000 
 
The second subset is comprised of initial sales from 1998-2000. Once again the foreclosure 
sample size is quite small. Nonetheless, as with sales pairs initiated in 1995-1997, the 
Foreclosure Sale Pairs dominated the Market Sale Pairs over all holding periods.  
 
The hypothesis that Foreclosed Sales Pairs return more than Market Sales Pairs is again strongly 
supported by the 1998-2000 data. The previous discussion of the results from 1995-1997 is 
relevant here as well. Causation remains unclear. Without controlling location down to a 
neighborhood or even micro-neighborhood level we cannot be sure that the “Foreclosure Effect” 
is not in reality “Location Effect”.  
 
Table 10 
 
 
Table 11 
 
As discussed previously foreclosures beget foreclosures as vacant houses are not maintained and 
eventually are boarded up, usually vandalized and eventually sold. Therefore, while it seems 
quite likely that there is evidence “Location Effect” at the same time that “Location Effect” is, in 
no small part, created by the foreclosures in that location. Whereas CCN effectively debunked 
the foreclosure discount and largely attributed it to location instead, they did not consider the 
cause behind the location discount. CCN proved that when location is properly controlled, the 
foreclosure sale price discount disappears. Meaning the properties sold through foreclosure sell 
at roughly equivalent prices when compared to other properties in their neighborhood. However, 
the study also indicated foreclosure sales achieved lower sales prices relative to market sales in 
other parts of the cities studied. 
 
Cleaned Foreclosure Results for Sales Pairs Initiated in 1998-2000
Holding Period (Years) 1 2 3 4 & 5
Average Annual Appreciation 30% 35% 30% 41%
Net Number of Observations 84 7 7 7
Observations Dropped 13 3 0 2
Initial Purchase in Years 1998-2000
Corresponding Sales in Years 1999-2006
Cleaned Market Results for Sales Pairs Initiated in 1998-2000
Holding Period (Years) 1 2 3 4 & 5
Average Annual Appreciation 28% 21% 22% 21%
Net Number of Observations 328 558 649 1205
Observations Dropped 38 2 1 2
Initial Purchase in Years 1998-2000
Corresponding Sales in Years 1999-2006
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I suspect the cumulative negative effect of a cascade of foreclosures is one of the main 
determinants of price in depressed neighborhoods. The neighborhood may or may not be similar 
in makeup to the rest of the city. If two neighborhoods are substantially similar and one suffers 
the trigger of a wave of foreclosures it is no small leap to make the connection between an 
ensuing price discount and the preceding foreclosures. Hence the “Location Effect” which is 
masquerading as “Foreclosure Effect” may, in large part, actually be “Foreclosure Effect”. This 
line of reasoning blurs the understanding of whether foreclosures effects on price are direct or 
indirect. I believe that the effects are both direct, through lower prices accepted due to rapid 
marketing time frames, atypical seller motivation (lenders cleaning up balance sheets etc.) and 
indirect as the net effect of rundown properties is decreased values and more foreclosures. It is 
easy to see why it is oft referred to as a vicious cycle. Depressed cities have long suffered this 
self-reinforcing feedback loop. However, the good news is that foreclosed properties appear to 
represent a great opportunity to earn excess returns in the residential housing market-if only you 
choose the right part of the cycle, that being when the market has turned and begun the next 
phase of positive momentum. 
 
Below is a graph of the results from sale pairs initiated in 1998-2000. 
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Figure 6 Foreclosure & Market Sales 1998-2000
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Chapter 5: Conclusions & Considerations 
 
Interpretations of the results are far too wide ranging to completely enumerate and discuss. For 
example, it is quite likely that foreclosure buyers have a far different set of expectations when 
entering a purchase than do fair market property buyers. Foreclosure buyers are bargain hunters 
who may or may not be more sophisticated buyers. We might expect investors in foreclosed 
properties to understand their market, the valuation, rehabilitation costs and profit potential of 
such properties. Then again a great number of owner occupant buyers may be less sophisticated 
bargain hunters looking to get any form of housing at the lowest cost available and ignore 
potential defects and distress in the property and neighborhood in the process. In addition they 
may already live in the blighted neighborhood and be inclined to overlook issues and challenges 
at which others might balk. 
 
Fair market buyers are primarily owner occupants who expect to live in the home for several 
years. I would expect a smaller number of investors in this market place. Fair market buyers are 
also likely to be better financed and can, in theory, overreach for a property they desire. At the 
same time they are likely better educated and again, in theory, should make better decisions 
about pricing and financing. That being said a home is quite often more an emotional decision 
than a financial one.  
 
It is quite difficult to tease out the motivations of different sets of buyers. Furthermore it is even 
more complicated to assign effects to their motivations and then forecast returns to various types 
of properties. However with repeat sales price appreciation numbers one could either toil on the 
ground to truly understand the underlying factors in a micro-neighborhood or rather more 
casually cast a blind eye to some of the more intractably difficult to elucidate problems and 
invest based on historical returns. That of course may take some faith that the past will in some 
way be a prelude to the future. With a grain of salt or two it may be appropriate to keep in mind 
the words of General Santayana who famously quipped, “Those who forget the past are doomed 
to repeat it.” And based on my research that actually would not be so bad for investors in 
foreclosed properties. 
 
Regardless this is an apropos time to examine foreclosures, especially in Massachusetts. FGS 
find, in 2007:Q4, “approximately 94,600 Massachusetts borrowers are in a position of negative 
equity.” This represents approximately ten percent of all Massachusetts borrowers.26 Though it 
may be verboten in economics to intone, “it is different this time”, I think now the statement 
rings true. Unfortunately I am not espousing a paradigmatic shift in equity markets, which leads 
to never-ending parabolic price growth. Instead I believe, there will be greater incidence of 
foreclosure due to new and exotic debt vehicles happily sold (and bought) into the marketplace, 
fueling growth on the positive swing of the real estate cycle. Evidence suggests a substantial 
increase in the LTV and debt-to-income ratios of subprime borrowers over the last preceding 
                                                          
26
 Foote, C.L., Gerardi, K., Willen, P.S., Negative Equity and Foreclosure: Theory and Evidence. Public Poloicy 
Discussion Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, June 5, 2008. 
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downturn during the 1990’s.27  FGS therefore expect “ a higher percentage of borrowers with 
negative equity in 2007 to subsequently default on their mortgages, compared with negative 
equity borrowers in the early 1990’s.”28 
 
At this point the extent of the current crisis falls into the “things we know we don’t know” 
category. What we know is that, based on historical patterns the current crisis will likely get 
worse. Furthermore, extrapolating from previous real estate recessions and adding in new 
pressures such as subprime may complicate predicting the future but in no modeling I can 
envision are they a palliative for the current foreclosure wave. There really is no best-case 
scenario. People are being displaced from their homes without options for adequate housing. 
What little equity was once invested into many of these foreclosed homes has been or will be 
lost. Lenders that have so far avoided massive writedowns either did not participate in residential 
mortgage origination, have the losses hidden awaiting future writedowns, or actually practiced 
proper risk management. All the other lenders will feel as much or more pain as the 
homeowners. The bankers and mortgage brokers complicit in the subprime mess (I wish them no 
ill will- caveat emptor, right?) may soon be out of jobs as originations dry up and banks with 
large losses “right size” their businesses. Said brokers may be the next wave of foreclosures; 
adding to the feedback loop, further pressuring prices. 
 
 
Large scale loan modification or forebearance schemes may help some homeowners, but most 
will have to just take their lumps as the property and debt markets take their course. With 
inflation (stagflation?) around the corner (Someone has to pay for the wars right?) mortgage rates 
are likely headed upward. Availability and pricing of debt may be undergoing a structural shift in 
which it is harder and dearer to procure. This shift will obviously not be the fuel of the next real 
estate price surge. Rather, it is the halon and wet sprinkler system combining to douse, in the 
short and intermediate term, any remaining embers which would seek to reignite the previous 
boom. 
 
There are positives, which should warm the hearts of value investors and those that “know 
better”. Real estate prices decoupled from incomes in the early 2000’s and never looked back 
until late 2005. As Robert Shiller (and William Wheaton) has pronounced time and time again, 
this just was not sustainable. Whatever the underlying cause of the income/price mismatch 
buyers can only pay a certain amount of their income toward housing. Water and oxygen may be 
free in some locales but one must generally pay for food and clothing (not to mention Ipod’s, cell 
phones, plasma TV’s, cars, soda, Fritos, diapers etc. etc.). So in this instance Shiller had it right, 
there could not be a paradigmatic shift in the price/income ratio, it has been and is mean 
reverting. We would all do well to take the long view remember that. That being said, the 
glorious inefficiency of the residential market and its persistency of returns leave plenty of room 
for profits, even excess profits (the kind for which we all search). 
                                                          
27
 Foote, C.L., Gerardi, K., Goette, L., Willen, P.S., “Subprime Facts: What (We Think) We Know About the 
Subprime Crisis and What We Don’t”, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Public Policy Discussion Paper No. 08-2. 
28
 Foote, C.L., Gerardi, K., Willen, P.S., Negative Equity and Foreclosure: Theory and Evidence. Public Poloicy 
Discussion Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, June 5, 2008. 
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So though it may take a cold heart, or at least an appetite for opportunity and a calculating 
mindset, to search for profit while others listlessly suffer through foreclosures I don’t believe this 
is s zero sum game in any sense. One must wait for the bottom of the cycle. Contrary to what we 
sometimes see in the stock market the residential cycle is fairly long and has not historically 
produced a V-shaped bottom. However, once one is reasonably convinced the time is right they 
should begin to buy, as soon and as much as possible. For, just as there is a feedback loop on the 
way down, so there is a feedback loop on the way back up. I firmly believe that the best course 
of action is to buy as many depressed properties as possible in very close proximity to each 
other, preferably on the same street. As the houses are cleaned up other owners will begin to 
reinvest and new buyers and investors will be attracted. Hence it takes a few pioneers with vision 
and a stock of dry powder, (or available liquid-choose your metaphor) to trigger the next phase 
in the real estate cycle. 
 
Actual investment and business strategies will have to be the topic of another paper, however I 
believe it is worth discussing the global macro-economic situation briefly once more. There is no 
escaping the inflationary signals. Perhaps they are all false signals. I believe oil is overpriced and 
some of the current profits from $140/bbl. oil will be reinvested to extract greater amounts of oil 
from the ground. Colorado, Wyoming, Alberta and the waters off Brazil and under the polar ice 
cap hold enormous oil reserves; the only drawback being extraction methods and costs. Other 
commodity prices will likely rise and fall over time. Of greater concern is the true integration of 
China and India into the world economy. They have bestowed unmitigated benefits to the world 
over the last 30 years in the form of cheap goods and cheap credit (I don’t mean to belittle the 
plight of industrialized country manufacturing workers or ignore pollution, global warming or 
other related problems).  
 
China and India, and to a lesser extent Indonesia and all of Southeast Asia have entered a new 
phase in their march to modernization and prosperity. Instead of an unlimited supply of labor so 
cheap as to be an after thought in the cost of inputs, labor costs are now being globalized and 
commoditized. Manufacturers in China have begun to seek cheaper labor pools in Vietnam and 
other developing countries. However the list of “cheap labor” countries is dwindling rapidly. As 
Chinese and Indian laborers demand and receive better working conditions and greater pay they 
become the inflationary force behind higher product prices worldwide. Furthermore their wage 
gains contribute to internal consumption of everything from foodstuffs to consumer goods like 
cell phones, computers, appliances, automobiles and any other Western convenience you can 
name. This internal consumption and competition for goods, services and commodities will have 
a tremendous impact on the global prices and global stability. It may be a good thing in the long 
term to begin to close the wealth gap between East and West. But it may also be very painful, on 
a global scale to integrate nearly half the world’s population into a more modern global society. 
 
These global forces are far from irrelevant to real estate investment in the United States and other 
industrialized nations. One must truly seek to understand the yield curve to profitably invest for 
the long term. Inflation, mortgage rates, immigration patterns and global demand and 
consumption are very likely to change considerably over the next ten to twenty years. These 
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perceived difficulties also present opportunities for investment the world over. Over half the 
world’s population lives in what the West considers substandard housing. Who will build them 
new housing? At what cost will it be built and with what and whose materials?  
 
For those who prefer to stay closer to home the results of this admittedly limited study indicate 
that the residential market is not truly efficient and that there is potential opportunity for those 
willing to take risk and do a little neighborhood building. So despite a very complicated global 
picture, and a trough that may be deeper than in the past, we must remember that residential real 
estate in particular is a cyclical industry. Neighborhoods rise and fall and rise again. People 
move to the suburbs from the city and then back to the city again. Institutions, REIT’S and 
Private Equity Funds allocate dollars to real estate in good times and bad. To wrest outsized 
profits from the residential real estate market one should wait until the market starts to recover, 
lever their funds, allocate them to foreclosed properties, ride the cycle for between two and five 
years (possibly longer), collect rents and sell when target returns are met or market conditions 
change. By then there will be another challenge, another opportunity somewhere, awaiting 
capital and entrepreneurial vision and drive. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
 
  
MIT Sales Transaction Record Layout – amended 12/15/2006 
 
  FIELD NAME DESCRIPTION TYPE LENGTH 
1 PROPID Internal Property Record Number (for 
updating) 
Number  9 
2 TRANID Internal Sales Transaction Number (for 
updating) 
Number  9 
3 MODITYPE Indicates whether this is an "Add", 
"Change" or "Delete" Record 
Text 1 
4 SOURCE Record Source -  Sales trxn  - ‘S’ Text 1 
5 STATE State Code of situs address Text 2 
6 COUNTY Full county name of situs address Text 15 
7 CITY Town/city name of situs address Text 20 
8 STNUM Number Portion of Situs Address Street 
Number 
Number  5 
9 STNUMEXT Additional Situs Street Number characters 
– as in 82-84 
Text 5 
10 STREET Situs Address Street name including 
directionals 
Text 25 
11 LOTCODE Describes Content of Situs address Unit 
field – Lot or Parcel or Unit  
Text 1 
12 UNIT Situs address Lot, parcel or unit number Text 6 
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13 ZIPCODE Zip5 – 5 digit portion of situs zip code Text 5 
14 PLUS4 Plus4 portion of situs zip code Text 4 
15 CARRIER_RT Postal Carrier Route of Situs Text 8 
16 LATITUDE Global Latitude relative to the Equator Number 
(decimal) 
10.6 
17 LONGITUDE Global Longitude relative to Greenwich 
England 
Number 
(Decimal) 
11.6 
18 CNSSTRACT US statistical census tract Text 6 
19 CNSSBLCK US statistical census block Text 4 
20 BUYER1FN First name + middle initial portion of Buyer1 Text 15 
21 BUYER1LN Last name portion of Buyer1 (includes 
company names) 
Text 25 
22 BUYER2FN First name + middle initial portion of Buyer2 Text 15 
23 BUYER2LN Last name portion of Buyer2 (includes 
company names) 
Text 25 
24 BUYERREL Relationship of Buyer1 and Buyer2 Text 15 
25 SELLER1FN First name + middle initial portion of Seller1 Text 15 
26 SELLER1LN Last name portion of Seller1 (includes 
company names) 
Text 25 
27 SELLER2FN First name + middle initial portion of Seller2 Text 15 
28 SELLER2LN Last name portion of Seller2 (includes 
company names) 
Text 25 
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29 SELLERREL Relationship of Seller1 and Seller2 Text 15 
30 BOOK Town Clerk book/volume number – this 
sales trxn 
Number  5 
31 PAGE Town Clerk page number – this sales trxn Number  4 
32 PRICE Consideration amount of this sales trxn Number  9 
33 DATE Date of this sales trxn Text 8  
(yyyymm
dd) 
34 DEEDTYPE DeedType of this sale trxn Text 15 
35 SALETYPE  Salestype of this sales trxn Text 20 
36 NOMINAL "Y" indicates that this sales trxn 
consideration < $100 
Text 1 
37 VALIDSALE "Y" indicates that this sale was arms-length 
trxn 
Text 1 
38 MORTGAGE Mortgage amount of mortgage associated 
with this sales trxn 
Number  9 
39 LENDER Lender name of mortgage associated with 
this sales trxn 
Text 21 
40 PROPUSE Property Usage at time of Sale Text 12 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
Dropped Observations= Ann. APP > 100% 
         
Foreclosure Observations 1998-2000 
PROPID LSTSLPR sale_year DEEDTYP
E 
CITY PriceDiff YearsElap
sed 
Price 
APP. 
Ann. APP 
2004516 54000 1998 Foreclosur
e 
Lynn 70000 1 130% 130% 
2007261 49500 1998 Foreclosur
e 
Lynn 50500 1 102% 102% 
2007338 34462 1998 Foreclosur
e 
Lynn 56438 1 164% 164% 
3183985 56000 1998 Foreclosur
e 
Lowell 65500 1 117% 117% 
972644 38000 1998 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 97000 1 255% 255% 
973720 48000 1998 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 65000 1 135% 135% 
974526 67000 1998 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 69000 1 103% 103% 
1287469 55700 1998 Foreclosur
e 
Chelsea 68300 1 123% 123% 
960744 62000 1999 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 123000 1 198% 198% 
965536 47500 1999 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 93500 1 197% 197% 
969729 54129 1999 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 73871 1 136% 136% 
3180401 50000 2000 Foreclosur
e 
Lowell 49900 1 100% 100% 
963834 40000 2000 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 102000 1 255% 255% 
1373608 30100 1999 Foreclosur
e 
Revere 94900 2 315% 158% 
965661 52000 2000 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 163000 2 313% 157% 
2000364 55000 2000 Foreclosur
e 
Lynn 192500 2 350% 175% 
3198430 25000 1998 Foreclosur
e 
Lowell 245000 4 980% 245% 
961685 35200 1999 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 158800 4 451% 113% 
         
Market Observations 1998-2000 
PROPID LSTSLPR sale_year DEEDTYP
E 
CITY PriceDiff YearsElap
sed 
Price 
APP. 
Ann. APP 
952456 55000 1998 Land 
Court 
Brockton 74900 1 136% 136% 
955832 50000 1998  Brockton 61900 1 124% 124% 
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958924 53500 1998  Brockton 62100 1 116% 116% 
961878 20000 1998  Brockton 82000 1 410% 410% 
971819 49500 1998  Brockton 54500 1 110% 110% 
1380176 77500 1998  Revere 100500 1 130% 130% 
1993931 72500 1998  Lynn 72400 1 100% 100% 
1999773 48700 1998  Lynn 49800 1 102% 102% 
2004707 45000 1998  Lynn 73000 1 162% 162% 
2007717 51000 1998  Lynn 74900 1 147% 147% 
3292038 65000 1998  Taunton 113000 1 174% 174% 
3292104 40000 1998  Taunton 118700 1 297% 297% 
3292139 31500 1998  Taunton 113400 1 360% 360% 
752318 130000 1999  Somerville 265000 1 204% 204% 
755803 145000 1999  Somerville 166000 1 114% 114% 
1993417 73000 1999  Lynn 76900 1 105% 105% 
1995993 74000 1999  Lynn 85000 1 115% 115% 
2001076 125000 1999  Lynn 130000 1 104% 104% 
2003089 65000 1999  Lynn 77900 1 120% 120% 
3176945 77500 1999 Land 
Court 
Lowell 82400 1 106% 106% 
3183332 70000 1999  Lowell 80000 1 114% 114% 
3291136 52900 1999  Taunton 148000 1 280% 280% 
3291853 64900 1999  Taunton 134889 1 208% 208% 
3291890 54900 1999  Taunton 131500 1 240% 240% 
752108 14000 2000  Somerville 216000 1 1543% 1543% 
953448 80000 2000  Brockton 115000 1 144% 144% 
969616 40304 2000  Brockton 171596 1 426% 426% 
969628 38000 2000  Brockton 86900 1 229% 229% 
1285251 141000 2000  Chelsea 149000 1 106% 106% 
1992749 80000 2000  Lynn 149000 1 186% 186% 
1996794 4000 2000  Lynn 265900 1 6648% 6648% 
1998698 78000 2000 Land 
Court 
Lynn 89000 1 114% 114% 
1998806 73000 2000  Lynn 102000 1 140% 140% 
2007437 70500 2000  Lynn 117000 1 166% 166% 
3177313 125000 2000  Lowell 145000 1 116% 116% 
3189164 60000 2000  Lowell 63000 1 105% 105% 
3190149 65000 2000  Lowell 94900 1 146% 146% 
3192443 5000 2000  Lowell 131000 1 2620% 2620% 
969025 30000 1998  Brockton 72000 2 240% 120% 
4043649 62500 2000  Brockton 187400 2 300% 150% 
1289940 78500 1999  Chelsea 251500 3 320% 107% 
969528 5000 2000  Brockton 255000 4 5100% 1275% 
3291939 31500 1998  Taunton 223500 5 710% 142% 
         
         
Foreclosure Sales 1995-1997 
PROPID LSTSLPR sale_year DEEDTYP
E 
CITY PriceDiff YearsElap
sed 
Price 
APP. 
Ann. APP 
483198 40000 1995 Foreclosur
e 
Everett 94900 1 237% 237% 
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3187962 40000 1995 Foreclosur
e 
Lowell 46000 1 115% 115% 
3189174 17000 1995 Foreclosur
e 
Lowell 37800 1 222% 222% 
961275 20000 1995 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 37000 1 185% 185% 
968062 16000 1995 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 87900 1 549% 549% 
968977 32000 1995 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 43000 1 134% 134% 
1366041 50500 1995 Foreclosur
e 
Revere 59400 1 118% 118% 
1367119 20250 1995 Foreclosur
e 
Revere 89750 1 443% 443% 
1375446 27100 1995 Foreclosur
e 
Revere 102900 1 380% 380% 
1375941 40000 1995 Foreclosur
e 
Revere 53500 1 134% 134% 
1993602 37000 1995 Foreclosur
e 
Lynn 37000 1 100% 100% 
1999176 27600 1995 Foreclosur
e 
Lynn 83900 1 304% 304% 
482643 38000 1996 Foreclosur
e 
Everett 60000 1 158% 158% 
949489 15201 1996 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 53549 1 352% 352% 
953358 25000 1996 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 64675 1 259% 259% 
956358 26200 1996 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 35800 1 137% 137% 
958508 34000 1996 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 61000 1 179% 179% 
2004613 15300 1996 Foreclosur
e 
Lynn 102700 1 671% 671% 
2981177 44373 1996 Foreclosur
e 
Taunton 81627 1 184% 184% 
3183742 25415 1996 Foreclosur
e 
Lowell 36085 1 142% 142% 
3189244 29500 1996 Foreclosur
e 
Lowell 33400 1 113% 113% 
3197660 55100 1996 Foreclosur
e 
Lowell 74900 1 136% 136% 
961984 20000 1996 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 59900 1 300% 300% 
973108 35000 1996 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 63500 1 181% 181% 
1998962 28500 1996 Foreclosur
e 
Lynn 51840 1 182% 182% 
2000120 32077 1996 Foreclosur
e 
Lynn 43923 1 137% 137% 
957046 39555 1997 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 39445 1 100% 100% 
2004931 65000 1997 Foreclosur
e 
Lynn 74900 1 115% 115% 
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e 
2007049 21000 1997 Foreclosur
e 
Lynn 39000 1 186% 186% 
2978557 20000 1997 Foreclosur
e 
Taunton 39700 1 199% 199% 
3176042 59000 1997 Foreclosur
e 
Lowell 65900 1 112% 112% 
3193153 18000 1997 Foreclosur
e 
Lowell 20500 1 114% 114% 
972779 25000 1997 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 86000 1 344% 344% 
1369430 25000 1997 Foreclosur
e 
Revere 50000 1 200% 200% 
2003095 26000 1997 Foreclosur
e 
Lynn 34500 1 133% 133% 
2003170 50000 1997 Foreclosur
e 
Lynn 75000 1 150% 150% 
957154 5000 1995 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 85000 2 1700% 850% 
3190380 4927 1995 Foreclosur
e 
Lowell 15173 2 308% 154% 
966482 1000 1995 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 92000 2 9200% 4600% 
955780 22500 1996 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 52500 2 233% 117% 
965978 13500 1996 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 96500 3 715% 238% 
1366412 22000 1995 Foreclosur
e 
Revere 117000 4 532% 133% 
2003121 21632 1995 Foreclosur
e 
Lynn 86368 4 399% 100% 
3687306 16000 1996 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 101300 4 633% 158% 
956321 5000 1997 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 154900 4 3098% 775% 
         
Market Sales 1995-1997 
PROPID LSTSLPR sale_year DEEDTYP
E 
CITY PriceDiff YearsElap
sed 
Price 
APP. 
Ann. APP 
1986779 60000 1995  Lynn 91500 1 153% 153% 
2002359 50000 1995  Lynn 75000 1 150% 150% 
2005401 10000 1995  Lynn 107500 1 1075% 1075% 
3180852 47000 1995  Lowell 70100 1 149% 149% 
3182641 36000 1995  Lowell 42000 1 117% 117% 
3190553 10000 1995  Lowell 34900 1 349% 349% 
3291527 45000 1995  Taunton 97500 1 217% 217% 
482740 60000 1996 Land 
Court 
Everett 67000 1 112% 112% 
953949 50500 1996  Brockton 56000 1 111% 111% 
1289669 40000 1996  Chelsea 66000 1 165% 165% 
1377352 60000 1996  Revere 66500 1 111% 111% 
1988508 46000 1996 Land 
Court 
Lynn 61500 1 134% 134% 
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Court 
1990311 53000 1996  Lynn 94000 1 177% 177% 
1990827 47000 1996  Lynn 95000 1 202% 202% 
1992445 54000 1996  Lynn 65000 1 120% 120% 
1994508 40500 1996  Lynn 44000 1 109% 109% 
1998212 42500 1996  Lynn 77000 1 181% 181% 
1999455 37500 1996  Lynn 40500 1 108% 108% 
2972832 47000 1996  Taunton 80400 1 171% 171% 
3177890 35000 1996  Lowell 38000 1 109% 109% 
956995 25000 1997  Brockton 49900 1 200% 200% 
958628 40000 1997  Brockton 52900 1 132% 132% 
966478 10000 1997  Brockton 48000 1 480% 480% 
966934 65000 1997  Brockton 76528 1 118% 118% 
1991945 65000 1997  Lynn 84900 1 131% 131% 
1997306 68500 1997  Lynn 74400 1 109% 109% 
1998116 55000 1997  Lynn 57000 1 104% 104% 
2000579 55000 1997  Lynn 55000 1 100% 100% 
2007437 46000 1997  Lynn 82000 1 178% 178% 
2981841 68000 1997  Taunton 116500 1 171% 171% 
2984395 27000 1997  Taunton 78000 1 289% 289% 
3179493 56000 1997  Lowell 68900 1 123% 123% 
3195483 47000 1997  Lowell 72500 1 154% 154% 
3291149 31500 1997  Taunton 108000 1 343% 343% 
3291150 31500 1997  Taunton 87400 1 277% 277% 
3291833 49900 1997  Taunton 76200 1 153% 153% 
3291841 40000 1997  Taunton 119900 1 300% 300% 
3291869 54900 1997  Taunton 95000 1 173% 173% 
3291881 31500 1997  Taunton 117946 1 374% 374% 
3291958 31500 1997  Taunton 98400 1 312% 312% 
2974585 25000 1995  Taunton 65000 2 260% 130% 
949986 68000 1997  Brockton 269000 3 396% 132% 
2004012 5000 1996  Lynn 144900 4 2898% 725% 
955872 10000 1997  Brockton 199000 4 1990% 498% 
971230 21000 1996  Brockton 112500 5 536% 107% 
2004185 1150 1997  Lynn 185850 5 16161% 3232% 
         
Foreclosure Sales 1992-1994 
PROPID LSTSLPR sale_year DEEDTYP
E 
CITY PriceDiff YearsElap
sed 
Price 
APP. 
Ann. APP 
966021 19600 1992 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 20300 1 104% 104% 
1380076 10000 1992 Foreclosur
e 
Revere 168000 1 1680% 1680% 
956521 5000 1993 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 110000 1 2200% 2200% 
958372 32000 1993 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 34000 1 106% 106% 
962760 28000 1993 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 37000 1 132% 132% 
964903 21350 1993 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 28650 1 134% 134% 
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969572 21146 1993 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 40854 1 193% 193% 
970063 31500 1993 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 43000 1 137% 137% 
1999591 6000 1993 Foreclosur
e 
Lynn 50900 1 848% 848% 
2001374 12000 1993 Foreclosur
e 
Lynn 67900 1 566% 566% 
968228 10000 1994 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 43000 1 430% 430% 
968589 42500 1994 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 102500 1 241% 241% 
971017 33000 1994 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 60900 1 185% 185% 
971257 40500 1994 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 77500 1 191% 191% 
971317 22203 1994 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 53797 1 242% 242% 
974820 32000 1994 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 34800 1 109% 109% 
1370961 50000 1994 Foreclosur
e 
Revere 125000 1 250% 250% 
2003015 22400 1994 Foreclosur
e 
Lynn 30100 1 134% 134% 
2007213 26910 1994 Foreclosur
e 
Lynn 36090 1 134% 134% 
2007322 30000 1994 Foreclosur
e 
Lynn 39000 1 130% 130% 
2982429 50000 1994 Foreclosur
e 
Taunton 59900 1 120% 120% 
3185602 23218 1994 Foreclosur
e 
Lowell 31882 1 137% 137% 
3191180 20000 1994 Foreclosur
e 
Lowell 35000 1 175% 175% 
960355 30000 1994 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 62500 2 208% 104% 
969572 35000 1994 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 94900 2 271% 136% 
760318 1000 1993 Foreclosur
e 
Somerville 79000 3 7900% 2633% 
         
Market Sales 1992-1994 
PROPID LSTSLPR sale_year DEEDTYP
E 
CITY PriceDiff YearsElap
sed 
Price 
APP. 
Ann. APP 
968197 15000 1992  Brockton 79900 1 533% 533% 
2968521 45500 1992  Taunton 59500 1 131% 131% 
2968568 45500 1992  Taunton 81500 1 179% 179% 
2972996 46900 1992  Taunton 81100 1 173% 173% 
2974500 35000 1992  Taunton 61000 1 174% 174% 
2981471 109000 1992  Taunton 134400 1 123% 123% 
2984317 42000 1992  Taunton 153000 1 364% 364% 
1986445 40000 1993  Lynn 125000 1 313% 313% 
3173812 45000 1993  Lowell 87500 1 194% 194% 
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3196705 35000 1993  Lowell 42000 1 120% 120% 
753010 24333 1994  Somerville 120667 1 496% 496% 
956147 18000 1994  Brockton 62400 1 347% 347% 
1988689 51000 1994  Lynn 52000 1 102% 102% 
1999135 50000 1994  Lynn 50000 1 100% 100% 
959016 12000 1993  Brockton 54500 2 454% 227% 
1987036 140000 1993 Land 
Court 
Lynn 2010000 2 1436% 718% 
752741 120000 1994  Somerville 250000 2 208% 104% 
1988931 10000 1992 Land 
Court 
Lynn 52500 3 525% 175% 
964617 3000 1993  Brockton 69900 4 2330% 583% 
970598 74900 1994  Brockton 674100 5 900% 180% 
         
Foreclosure Sales 1990-1991 
PROPID LSTSLPR sale_year DEEDTYP
E 
CITY PriceDiff YearsElap
sed 
Price 
APP. 
Ann. APP 
960537 2500 1990 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 104500 1 4180% 4180% 
968770 25000 1990 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 42500 1 170% 170% 
948753 65000 1991 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 85000 1 131% 131% 
965443 26000 1991 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 42000 1 162% 162% 
970351 16000 1991 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 56900 1 356% 356% 
972942 49000 1991 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 52000 1 106% 106% 
973060 28000 1991 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 51491 1 184% 184% 
1992220 3000 1991 Foreclosur
e 
Lynn 81400 1 2713% 2713% 
2005271 30000 1991 Foreclosur
e 
Lynn 48500 1 162% 162% 
948856 30000 1990 Foreclosur
e 
Brockton 70000 2 233% 117% 
2000500 44100 1991 Foreclosur
e 
Lynn 103400 2 234% 117% 
4508587 90000 1991 Foreclosur
e 
Taunton 742633 2 825% 413% 
         
Market Sales 1990-1991 
PROPID LSTSLPR sale_year DEEDTYP
E 
CITY PriceDiff YearsElap
sed 
Price 
APP. 
Ann. APP 
1996445 60000 1990  Lynn 65000 1 108% 108% 
2975221 65000 1990  Taunton 75000 1 115% 115% 
962393 40000 1991  Brockton 64000 1 160% 160% 
2972752 45000 1991  Taunton 63500 1 141% 141% 
2984552 32000 1991  Taunton 78900 1 247% 247% 
483402 12000 1991  Everett 88000 5 733% 147% 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
 
Census QuickFacts 
  
   
   
People QuickFacts Brockton Massachusetts 
Population, 2006 estimate     94,191 6,437,193 
Population, percent change, April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2006     -0.1% 1.4% 
Population, 2000     94,304 6,349,097 
Persons under 5 years old, percent, 2000     7.3% 6.3% 
Persons under 18 years old, percent, 2000     27.8% 23.6% 
Persons 65 years old and over, percent, 2000     11.7% 13.5% 
Female persons, percent, 2000     52.1% 51.8% 
   
White persons, percent, 2000 (a)     61.5% 84.5% 
Black persons, percent, 2000 (a)     17.8% 5.4% 
American Indian and Alaska Native persons, percent, 2000 (a)     0.4% 0.2% 
Asian persons, percent, 2000 (a)     2.2% 3.8% 
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander, percent, 2000 (a)     Z Z 
Persons reporting two or more races, percent, 2000     7.8% 2.3% 
Persons of Hispanic or Latino origin, percent, 2000 (b)     8.0% 6.8% 
   
Living in same house in 1995 and 2000, pct 5 yrs old & over     57.4% 58.5% 
Foreign born persons, percent, 2000     18.4% 12.2% 
Language other than English spoken at home, pct age 5+, 2000     28.4% 18.7% 
High school graduates, percent of persons age 25+, 2000     75.9% 84.8% 
Bachelor's degree or higher, pct of persons age 25+, 2000     14.0% 33.2% 
Mean travel time to work (minutes), workers age 16+, 2000     28.2 27 
   
Housing units, 2000     34,837 2,621,989 
Homeownership rate, 2000     54.6% 61.7% 
Median value of owner-occupied housing units, 2000     $128,300 $185,700 
   
Households, 2000     33,675 2,443,580 
Persons per household, 2000     2.74 2.51 
Median household income, 1999     $39,507 $50,502 
Per capita money income, 1999     $17,163 $25,952 
Persons below poverty, percent, 1999     14.5% 9.3% 
   
Business QuickFacts Brockton Massachusetts 
Wholesale trade sales, 2002 ($1000)     668,656 127,129,789 
Retail sales, 2002 ($1000)     1,313,341 73,903,837 
Retail sales per capita, 2002     $13,787 $11,527 
Accommodation and foodservices sales, 2002 ($1000)     114,297 11,789,582 
Total number of firms, 2002     5,198 563,539 
Black-owned firms, percent, 2002     12.6% 2.3% 
American Indian and Alaska Native owned firms, percent, 2002     F 0.4% 
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Asian-owned firms, percent, 2002     2.5% 3.2% 
Hispanic-owned firms, percent, 2002     3.5% 2.8% 
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander owned firms, percent, 2002     F S 
Women-owned firms, percent, 2002     24.8% 28.7% 
   
   
Geography QuickFacts Brockton Massachusetts 
Land area, 2000 (square miles)     21 7,840 
Persons per square mile, 2000     4,392.4 809.8 
FIPS Code     9000 25 
Counties     Plymouth County 
  
   
People QuickFacts Chelsea Massachusetts 
Population, 2006 estimate     32,792 6,437,193 
Population, percent change, April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2006     -6.5% 1.4% 
Population, 2000     35,080 6,349,097 
Persons under 5 years old, percent, 2000     8.1% 6.3% 
Persons under 18 years old, percent, 2000     27.3% 23.6% 
Persons 65 years old and over, percent, 2000     11.2% 13.5% 
Female persons, percent, 2000     49.8% 51.8% 
   
White persons, percent, 2000 (a)     57.9% 84.5% 
Black persons, percent, 2000 (a)     7.3% 5.4% 
American Indian and Alaska Native persons, percent, 2000 (a)     0.5% 0.2% 
Asian persons, percent, 2000 (a)     4.7% 3.8% 
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander, percent, 2000 (a)     0.1% Z 
Persons reporting two or more races, percent, 2000     6.6% 2.3% 
Persons of Hispanic or Latino origin, percent, 2000 (b)     48.4% 6.8% 
   
Living in same house in 1995 and 2000, pct 5 yrs old & over     50.0% 58.5% 
Foreign born persons, percent, 2000     36.1% 12.2% 
Language other than English spoken at home, pct age 5+, 2000     58.4% 18.7% 
High school graduates, percent of persons age 25+, 2000     59.5% 84.8% 
Bachelor's degree or higher, pct of persons age 25+, 2000     10.0% 33.2% 
Mean travel time to work (minutes), workers age 16+, 2000     30.7 27 
   
Housing units, 2000     12,337 2,621,989 
Homeownership rate, 2000     28.9% 61.7% 
Median value of owner-occupied housing units, 2000     $149,200 $185,700 
   
Households, 2000     11,888 2,443,580 
Persons per household, 2000     2.87 2.51 
Median household income, 1999     $30,161 $50,502 
Per capita money income, 1999     $14,628 $25,952 
Persons below poverty, percent, 1999     23.3% 9.3% 
   
Business QuickFacts Chelsea Massachusetts 
Wholesale trade sales, 2002 ($1000)     D 127,129,789 
Retail sales, 2002 ($1000)     222,296 73,903,837 
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Retail sales per capita, 2002     $6,452 $11,527 
Accommodation and foodservices sales, 2002 ($1000)     29,217 11,789,582 
Total number of firms, 2002     1,764 563,539 
Black-owned firms, percent, 2002     7.9% 2.3% 
American Indian and Alaska Native owned firms, percent, 2002     F 0.4% 
Asian-owned firms, percent, 2002     F 3.2% 
Hispanic-owned firms, percent, 2002     24.1% 2.8% 
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander owned firms, percent, 2002     F S 
Women-owned firms, percent, 2002     16.9% 28.7% 
   
   
Geography QuickFacts Chelsea Massachusetts 
Land area, 2000 (square miles)     2 7,840 
Persons per square mile, 2000     16,018.3 809.8 
FIPS Code     13205 25 
Counties     Suffolk County 
  
   
People QuickFacts Everett Massachusetts 
Population, 2006 estimate     37,008 6,437,193 
Population, percent change, April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2006     -2.7% 1.4% 
Population, 2000     38,037 6,349,097 
Persons under 5 years old, percent, 2000     5.9% 6.3% 
Persons under 18 years old, percent, 2000     21.6% 23.6% 
Persons 65 years old and over, percent, 2000     14.7% 13.5% 
Female persons, percent, 2000     52.4% 51.8% 
   
White persons, percent, 2000 (a)     79.7% 84.5% 
Black persons, percent, 2000 (a)     6.3% 5.4% 
American Indian and Alaska Native persons, percent, 2000 (a)     0.3% 0.2% 
Asian persons, percent, 2000 (a)     3.2% 3.8% 
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander, percent, 2000 (a)     0.1% Z 
Persons reporting two or more races, percent, 2000     5.4% 2.3% 
Persons of Hispanic or Latino origin, percent, 2000 (b)     9.5% 6.8% 
   
Living in same house in 1995 and 2000, pct 5 yrs old & over     57.0% 58.5% 
Foreign born persons, percent, 2000     21.9% 12.2% 
Language other than English spoken at home, pct age 5+, 2000     30.5% 18.7% 
High school graduates, percent of persons age 25+, 2000     76.2% 84.8% 
Bachelor's degree or higher, pct of persons age 25+, 2000     14.7% 33.2% 
Mean travel time to work (minutes), workers age 16+, 2000     34.8 27 
   
Housing units, 2000     15,908 2,621,989 
Homeownership rate, 2000     41.4% 61.7% 
Median value of owner-occupied housing units, 2000     $164,500 $185,700 
   
Households, 2000     15,435 2,443,580 
Persons per household, 2000     2.45 2.51 
Median household income, 1999     $40,661 $50,502 
Per capita money income, 1999     $19,845 $25,952 
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Persons below poverty, percent, 1999     11.8% 9.3% 
   
Business QuickFacts Everett Massachusetts 
Wholesale trade sales, 2002 ($1000)     1,444,298 127,129,789 
Retail sales, 2002 ($1000)     389,121 73,903,837 
Retail sales per capita, 2002     $10,342 $11,527 
Accommodation and foodservices sales, 2002 ($1000)     28,603 11,789,582 
Total number of firms, 2002     2,346 563,539 
Black-owned firms, percent, 2002     F 2.3% 
American Indian and Alaska Native owned firms, percent, 2002     F 0.4% 
Asian-owned firms, percent, 2002     S 3.2% 
Hispanic-owned firms, percent, 2002     S 2.8% 
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander owned firms, percent, 2002     F S 
Women-owned firms, percent, 2002     20.8% 28.7% 
   
   
Geography QuickFacts Everett Massachusetts 
Land area, 2000 (square miles)     3 7,840 
Persons per square mile, 2000     11,253.6 809.8 
FIPS Code     21990 25 
Counties     Middlesex County 
  
   
People QuickFacts Lowell Massachusetts 
Population, 2006 estimate     103,229 6,437,193 
Population, percent change, April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2006     -1.8% 1.4% 
Population, 2000     105,167 6,349,097 
Persons under 5 years old, percent, 2000     7.3% 6.3% 
Persons under 18 years old, percent, 2000     26.9% 23.6% 
Persons 65 years old and over, percent, 2000     10.8% 13.5% 
Female persons, percent, 2000     50.7% 51.8% 
   
White persons, percent, 2000 (a)     68.6% 84.5% 
Black persons, percent, 2000 (a)     4.2% 5.4% 
American Indian and Alaska Native persons, percent, 2000 (a)     0.2% 0.2% 
Asian persons, percent, 2000 (a)     16.5% 3.8% 
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander, percent, 2000 (a)     Z Z 
Persons reporting two or more races, percent, 2000     3.9% 2.3% 
Persons of Hispanic or Latino origin, percent, 2000 (b)     14.0% 6.8% 
   
Living in same house in 1995 and 2000, pct 5 yrs old & over     50.0% 58.5% 
Foreign born persons, percent, 2000     22.1% 12.2% 
Language other than English spoken at home, pct age 5+, 2000     40.7% 18.7% 
High school graduates, percent of persons age 25+, 2000     71.2% 84.8% 
Bachelor's degree or higher, pct of persons age 25+, 2000     18.1% 33.2% 
Mean travel time to work (minutes), workers age 16+, 2000     24.3 27 
   
Housing units, 2000     39,468 2,621,989 
Homeownership rate, 2000     43.0% 61.7% 
Median value of owner-occupied housing units, 2000     $134,200 $185,700 
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Households, 2000     37,887 2,443,580 
Persons per household, 2000     2.67 2.51 
Median household income, 1999     $39,192 $50,502 
Per capita money income, 1999     $17,557 $25,952 
Persons below poverty, percent, 1999     16.8% 9.3% 
   
Business QuickFacts Lowell Massachusetts 
Wholesale trade sales, 2002 ($1000)     895,555 127,129,789 
Retail sales, 2002 ($1000)     517,804 73,903,837 
Retail sales per capita, 2002     $4,957 $11,527 
Accommodation and foodservices sales, 2002 ($1000)     D 11,789,582 
Total number of firms, 2002     5,310 563,539 
Black-owned firms, percent, 2002     3.6% 2.3% 
American Indian and Alaska Native owned firms, percent, 2002     F 0.4% 
Asian-owned firms, percent, 2002     14.0% 3.2% 
Hispanic-owned firms, percent, 2002     3.7% 2.8% 
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander owned firms, percent, 2002     F S 
Women-owned firms, percent, 2002     27.3% 28.7% 
   
   
Geography QuickFacts Lowell Massachusetts 
Land area, 2000 (square miles)     13 7,840 
Persons per square mile, 2000     7,637.4 809.8 
FIPS Code     37000 25 
Counties     Middlesex County 
  
   
People QuickFacts Lynn Massachusetts 
Population, 2006 estimate     87,991 6,437,193 
Population, percent change, April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2006     -1.2% 1.4% 
Population, 2000     89,050 6,349,097 
Persons under 5 years old, percent, 2000     7.3% 6.3% 
Persons under 18 years old, percent, 2000     27.0% 23.6% 
Persons 65 years old and over, percent, 2000     12.8% 13.5% 
Female persons, percent, 2000     51.6% 51.8% 
   
White persons, percent, 2000 (a)     67.9% 84.5% 
Black persons, percent, 2000 (a)     10.5% 5.4% 
American Indian and Alaska Native persons, percent, 2000 (a)     0.4% 0.2% 
Asian persons, percent, 2000 (a)     6.4% 3.8% 
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander, percent, 2000 (a)     0.1% Z 
Persons reporting two or more races, percent, 2000     4.9% 2.3% 
Persons of Hispanic or Latino origin, percent, 2000 (b)     18.4% 6.8% 
   
Living in same house in 1995 and 2000, pct 5 yrs old & over     54.3% 58.5% 
Foreign born persons, percent, 2000     22.8% 12.2% 
Language other than English spoken at home, pct age 5+, 2000     34.1% 18.7% 
High school graduates, percent of persons age 25+, 2000     74.2% 84.8% 
Bachelor's degree or higher, pct of persons age 25+, 2000     16.4% 33.2% 
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Mean travel time to work (minutes), workers age 16+, 2000     27.5 27 
   
Housing units, 2000     34,637 2,621,989 
Homeownership rate, 2000     45.6% 61.7% 
Median value of owner-occupied housing units, 2000     $145,200 $185,700 
   
Households, 2000     33,511 2,443,580 
Persons per household, 2000     2.62 2.51 
Median household income, 1999     $37,364 $50,502 
Per capita money income, 1999     $17,492 $25,952 
Persons below poverty, percent, 1999     16.5% 9.3% 
   
Business QuickFacts Lynn Massachusetts 
Wholesale trade sales, 2002 ($1000)     357,770 127,129,789 
Retail sales, 2002 ($1000)     537,913 73,903,837 
Retail sales per capita, 2002     $5,991 $11,527 
Accommodation and foodservices sales, 2002 ($1000)     51,679 11,789,582 
Total number of firms, 2002     4,990 563,539 
Black-owned firms, percent, 2002     7.1% 2.3% 
American Indian and Alaska Native owned firms, percent, 2002     F 0.4% 
Asian-owned firms, percent, 2002     4.1% 3.2% 
Hispanic-owned firms, percent, 2002     16.2% 2.8% 
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander owned firms, percent, 2002     F S 
Women-owned firms, percent, 2002     33.1% 28.7% 
   
   
Geography QuickFacts Lynn Massachusetts 
Land area, 2000 (square miles)     10 7,840 
Persons per square mile, 2000     8,230.1 809.8 
FIPS Code     37490 25 
Counties     Essex County 
  
   
People QuickFacts Revere Massachusetts 
Population, 2006 estimate     46,833 6,437,193 
Population, percent change, April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2006     -0.9% 1.4% 
Population, 2000     47,283 6,349,097 
Persons under 5 years old, percent, 2000     5.8% 6.3% 
Persons under 18 years old, percent, 2000     21.0% 23.6% 
Persons 65 years old and over, percent, 2000     16.6% 13.5% 
Female persons, percent, 2000     51.6% 51.8% 
   
White persons, percent, 2000 (a)     84.4% 84.5% 
Black persons, percent, 2000 (a)     2.9% 5.4% 
American Indian and Alaska Native persons, percent, 2000 (a)     0.3% 0.2% 
Asian persons, percent, 2000 (a)     4.5% 3.8% 
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander, percent, 2000 (a)     0.1% Z 
Persons reporting two or more races, percent, 2000     3.8% 2.3% 
Persons of Hispanic or Latino origin, percent, 2000 (b)     9.4% 6.8% 
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Living in same house in 1995 and 2000, pct 5 yrs old & over     62.6% 58.5% 
Foreign born persons, percent, 2000     21.0% 12.2% 
Language other than English spoken at home, pct age 5+, 2000     29.1% 18.7% 
High school graduates, percent of persons age 25+, 2000     76.7% 84.8% 
Bachelor's degree or higher, pct of persons age 25+, 2000     13.5% 33.2% 
Mean travel time to work (minutes), workers age 16+, 2000     29.6 27 
   
Housing units, 2000     20,181 2,621,989 
Homeownership rate, 2000     50.0% 61.7% 
Median value of owner-occupied housing units, 2000     $168,200 $185,700 
   
Households, 2000     19,463 2,443,580 
Persons per household, 2000     2.41 2.51 
Median household income, 1999     $37,067 $50,502 
Per capita money income, 1999     $19,698 $25,952 
Persons below poverty, percent, 1999     14.6% 9.3% 
   
Business QuickFacts Revere Massachusetts 
Wholesale trade sales, 2002 ($1000)     D 127,129,789 
Retail sales, 2002 ($1000)     299,685 73,903,837 
Retail sales per capita, 2002     $6,346 $11,527 
Accommodation and foodservices sales, 2002 ($1000)     64,237 11,789,582 
Total number of firms, 2002     2,920 563,539 
Black-owned firms, percent, 2002     F 2.3% 
American Indian and Alaska Native owned firms, percent, 2002     F 0.4% 
Asian-owned firms, percent, 2002     13.4% 3.2% 
Hispanic-owned firms, percent, 2002     8.2% 2.8% 
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander owned firms, percent, 2002     F S 
Women-owned firms, percent, 2002     17.7% 28.7% 
   
   
Geography QuickFacts Revere Massachusetts 
Land area, 2000 (square miles)     5 7,840 
Persons per square mile, 2000     8,000.5 809.8 
FIPS Code     56585 25 
Counties     Suffolk County 
  
   
   
People QuickFacts Somerville Massachusetts 
Population, 2006 estimate     74,554 6,437,193 
Population, percent change, April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2006     -4.0% 1.4% 
Population, 2000     77,478 6,349,097 
Persons under 5 years old, percent, 2000     4.5% 6.3% 
Persons under 18 years old, percent, 2000     14.8% 23.6% 
Persons 65 years old and over, percent, 2000     10.5% 13.5% 
Female persons, percent, 2000     51.3% 51.8% 
   
White persons, percent, 2000 (a)     77.0% 84.5% 
Black persons, percent, 2000 (a)     6.5% 5.4% 
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American Indian and Alaska Native persons, percent, 2000 (a)     0.2% 0.2% 
Asian persons, percent, 2000 (a)     6.4% 3.8% 
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander, percent, 2000 (a)     0.1% Z 
Persons reporting two or more races, percent, 2000     4.8% 2.3% 
Persons of Hispanic or Latino origin, percent, 2000 (b)     8.8% 6.8% 
   
Living in same house in 1995 and 2000, pct 5 yrs old & over     44.5% 58.5% 
Foreign born persons, percent, 2000     29.3% 12.2% 
Language other than English spoken at home, pct age 5+, 2000     35.6% 18.7% 
High school graduates, percent of persons age 25+, 2000     80.6% 84.8% 
Bachelor's degree or higher, pct of persons age 25+, 2000     40.6% 33.2% 
Mean travel time to work (minutes), workers age 16+, 2000     27.8 27 
   
Housing units, 2000     32,477 2,621,989 
Homeownership rate, 2000     30.6% 61.7% 
Median value of owner-occupied housing units, 2000     $214,100 $185,700 
   
Households, 2000     31,555 2,443,580 
Persons per household, 2000     2.38 2.51 
Median household income, 1999     $46,315 $50,502 
Per capita money income, 1999     $23,628 $25,952 
Persons below poverty, percent, 1999     12.5% 9.3% 
   
Business QuickFacts Somerville Massachusetts 
Wholesale trade sales, 2002 ($1000)     236,367 127,129,789 
Retail sales, 2002 ($1000)     603,989 73,903,837 
Retail sales per capita, 2002     $7,866 $11,527 
Accommodation and foodservices sales, 2002 ($1000)     88,283 11,789,582 
Total number of firms, 2002     5,854 563,539 
Black-owned firms, percent, 2002     S 2.3% 
American Indian and Alaska Native owned firms, percent, 2002     F 0.4% 
Asian-owned firms, percent, 2002     6.6% 3.2% 
Hispanic-owned firms, percent, 2002     6.4% 2.8% 
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander owned firms, percent, 2002     F S 
Women-owned firms, percent, 2002     43.6% 28.7% 
   
   
Geography QuickFacts Somerville Massachusetts 
Land area, 2000 (square miles)     4 7,840 
Persons per square mile, 2000     18,851.1 809.8 
FIPS Code     62535 25 
Counties     Middlesex County 
  
   
   
People QuickFacts Taunton Massachusetts 
Population, 2006 estimate     56,074 6,437,193 
Population, percent change, April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2006     0.2% 1.4% 
Population, 2000     55,976 6,349,097 
Persons under 5 years old, percent, 2000     7.1% 6.3% 
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Persons under 18 years old, percent, 2000     24.9% 23.6% 
Persons 65 years old and over, percent, 2000     12.9% 13.5% 
Female persons, percent, 2000     51.9% 51.8% 
   
White persons, percent, 2000 (a)     91.7% 84.5% 
Black persons, percent, 2000 (a)     2.7% 5.4% 
American Indian and Alaska Native persons, percent, 2000 (a)     0.2% 0.2% 
Asian persons, percent, 2000 (a)     0.6% 3.8% 
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander, percent, 2000 (a)     Z Z 
Persons reporting two or more races, percent, 2000     2.2% 2.3% 
Persons of Hispanic or Latino origin, percent, 2000 (b)     3.9% 6.8% 
   
Living in same house in 1995 and 2000, pct 5 yrs old & over     59.6% 58.5% 
Foreign born persons, percent, 2000     10.1% 12.2% 
Language other than English spoken at home, pct age 5+, 2000     19.1% 18.7% 
High school graduates, percent of persons age 25+, 2000     74.8% 84.8% 
Bachelor's degree or higher, pct of persons age 25+, 2000     15.1% 33.2% 
Mean travel time to work (minutes), workers age 16+, 2000     27.2 27 
   
Housing units, 2000     22,908 2,621,989 
Homeownership rate, 2000     61.2% 61.7% 
Median value of owner-occupied housing units, 2000     $145,800 $185,700 
   
Households, 2000     22,045 2,443,580 
Persons per household, 2000     2.5 2.51 
Median household income, 1999     $42,932 $50,502 
Per capita money income, 1999     $19,899 $25,952 
Persons below poverty, percent, 1999     10.0% 9.3% 
   
Business QuickFacts Taunton Massachusetts 
Wholesale trade sales, 2002 ($1000)     1,079,652 127,129,789 
Retail sales, 2002 ($1000)     1,103,482 73,903,837 
Retail sales per capita, 2002     $19,478 $11,527 
Accommodation and foodservices sales, 2002 ($1000)     64,500 11,789,582 
Total number of firms, 2002     3,610 563,539 
Black-owned firms, percent, 2002     F 2.3% 
American Indian and Alaska Native owned firms, percent, 2002     F 0.4% 
Asian-owned firms, percent, 2002     F 3.2% 
Hispanic-owned firms, percent, 2002     F 2.8% 
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander owned firms, percent, 2002     F S 
Women-owned firms, percent, 2002     18.1% 28.7% 
   
   
Geography QuickFacts Taunton Massachusetts 
Land area, 2000 (square miles)     46 7,840 
Persons per square mile, 2000     1,200.9 809.8 
FIPS Code     69170 25 
Counties     Bristol County 
  
 
